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ABSTRACT 
LUCY PRUITT: Prosecutorial Power and Discretion In MS 
(Under the direction of Dr. Kyle Fritz) 
 
This thesis seeks to create a policy proposal in order to address incidences of 
prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of discretion in the Mississippi criminal justice 
system.  To do so, the author has summarized and analyzed seven criminal cases in which 
defendants have become victims of prosecutorial misconduct in order to shed light on the 
lack of prosecutorial accountability in the state’s criminal justice system.  In an attempt to 
solve the problem, the author has developed a novel grading rubric in order to objectively 
and systematically analyze and evaluate previously proposed policy recommendations by 
legal experts and justice organizations.  The successes and failures of each policy 
according to their evaluations of hypothetical implementation revealed the unique 
challenges to criminal justice reform attempts in the state of Mississippi.  Taking these 
challenges and further characteristics of the state into account, the author recommends 
greater prosecutorial transparency policies be implemented in the state, mandating that 
prosecutor’s offices disclose necessary data and information upon requests to the research 
agencies and judicial organizations studying incidences of prosecutorial abuse of power 
in Mississippi.  The author also recommends that the Mississippi legislature and 
government officials create a research funding mechanism that would support and foster 
collaboration across such organizations.  
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Introduction 
In 1996, Curtis Flowers, an African American man from Winona, MS, was 
charged with the murders of four people at a local furniture store.  Maintaining his 
innocence for over 20 years, Flowers was tried and convicted of the crime not once or 
even twice, but six times.  In each of the trials, the leading prosecutor was District 
Attorney Doug Evans, who committed prosecutorial misconduct and abused his powers 
of discretion endlessly throughout the duration of this entire case and was never 
professionally disciplined or stopped (Baran, 2019).  Flowers continued appealing his 
convictions and having them overturned due to misconduct by Doug Evans after each 
trial.  Those outside of Winona or a surrounding area probably had not learned of this 
strange and unsettling case, until a group of investigative journalists decided to figure out 
exactly what was keeping this case from final resolution (Baran, 2019).  The reasons they 
found were none other than pervasive instances of prosecutorial misconduct, abuses of 
power, and lack of any accountability or disciplinary measures to follow—even when 
they resulted in the overturning of convictions (Baran, 2019).  The case eventually made 
its way to the Supreme Court of the United States in early 2020, drawing new waves of 
media and public attention to Mississippi’s criminal justice system (Flowers v. 
Mississippi, No. 17–9572, 588 U.S. 2019). 
The case of Curtis Flowers raises two key questions: (1) why can a prosecutor 
continue to abuse his power with no professional discipline or accountability, and (2) 
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how frequently does prosecutorial abuse of power take place in Mississippi?  The main 
issue at hand is that most prosecutors’ offices do not attempt to gather basic information 
about their practices, nor write and publish policies which guide their decision-making or 
inform the public (Fortier, 2019).  The most comprehensive nationwide survey of state 
prosecutors’ offices, completed by the Urban Institute in 2018, found little prosecutorial 
data collection even in terms of basic case records (Fortier, 2019).  The survey collected 
data on “foundational case information,” which included the number of cases per office, 
number of charges, and records of case proceedings.  The study’s results reported that 
less than half of the offices nationally surveyed collect these basic data points, and even 
fewer publish the results.  Only 24 percent of offices surveyed reported making any 
available data analyses public (Fortier, 2019). This lack of data collection has long been 
the norm among prosecutors’ offices for a variety of reasons, but—besides the hassle 
involved in developing more bureaucratic paperwork—it is mostly due to the fact that 
there are almost no legal requirements that prosecutors record or publish any data (Spohn, 
2018).  
Because state prosecutors are not required to record or report information 
regarding their cases, the only cases of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of power which 
are recognized or documented are those which the court system has been forced to 
acknowledge and resolve.  Unless called to attention, these injustices may go 
unrecognized and unresolved.   Further, this lack of data means the frequency by which 
these incidences of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of power are happening is 
unknown, and there is no telling how many have happened in the past.  Many of these 
cases of misconduct go unnoticed or unfought for years or even decades, and this is an 
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issue that will be exhibited in the wide variations in timelines in the case studies I will 
present in Chapter 2.  Information regarding prosecutorial misconduct or abuses of 
discretion in Mississippi is only available in cases where the abuse has come to light, 
some of which I discuss in Chapter 2.  As a whole, these case studies are narratives which 
collectively tell the story of Mississippi’s problem of unchecked prosecutorial discretion.  
The frequency of prosecutorial abuse of discretion in Mississippi is unknown, but these 
cases show that it occurs more often than it should and with no consequences for the 
prosecutors, only for the victims of their discretion.  
The case of Curtis Flowers, along with a handful of others, is further examined 
and analyzed in the second chapter of this thesis which exhibits the particular threats to 
constitutional rights and judicial practices by unchecked discretionary powers of 
Mississippi prosecutors in the criminal justice system.  The goal of this thesis is to study 
and analyze prosecutorial misconduct in Mississippi in order to develop a policy 
recommendation which will prevent such injustices in the future by allowing us to better 
identify and address cases of prosecutorial misconduct in the state’s criminal justice 
system. By researching these known injustices and why they occur, as well as analyzing 
policy proposals from legal experts and organizations, I will explore ways to best prevent 
or minimize prosecutorial misconduct in MS, providing a novel rubric for evaluating 
some proposals and ranking them accordingly.  By the end of the thesis, I will have 
answered the questions: (1) why should Mississippi implement greater safeguards against 
prosecutorial abuses of discretion and power? And (2) how should Mississippi implement 
these safeguards? 
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The state of Mississippi was chosen for many reasons, much of which comes from 
a combination of my current location as a student at the University of Mississippi, 
background in studies of Mississippi public policy, and a deeper cultural understanding 
of the state as a whole gained throughout my entire life’s residency.  More importantly, 
however, is the reason to believe that Mississippi’s historical reputation of racism, 
classism, and political corruption is not merely historical.  These distinct characteristics 
and “old habits” of the state will need to be met with a tailored approach to prosecutorial 
reform.  To adequately grasp the scope of prosecutorial misconduct in Mississippi, it is 
important to understand the history of discriminatory laws and policies which still deeply 
influence the state today.  And although state-approved legislative action—such as Jim 
Crow Law—is no longer at play, the many implications of those policies—and the 
mindsets behind them—have yet to be completely eradicated.    
 In order to examine the possible problem of prosecutorial misconduct in 
Mississippi, I have compiled and analyzed seven case studies in which justice failed to be 
served by the court and are best explained by abuse of prosecutorial power.  The facts 
and details of these case studies were found through a variety of media publications, 
including investigative podcasts, documentary films, independent case studies, local 
newspaper articles and editorials, and public exoneration records. Each of these sources 
has been corroborated by publicly released information regarding the cases, ensuring 
media bias or sensationalism has not exaggerated or falsified the facts of the cases for any 
purposes, including receiving greater attention.  Because of the lack of officially recorded 
and reported data, finding recorded cases of prosecutorial misconduct, for the most part, 
was only possible if the case decision was overturned due to a cited offense or received 
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ample media attention.  Without the media attention and certain investigators’ and 
journalists’ dedication to justice, many of these cases of injustice would not have been 
resolved or even noticed, and for this reason, the cases of injustice and prosecutorial 
misconduct which have flown under the radar and been neglected by the justice system 
are unknown.  These seven cases are just a handful of the cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct and abuse of discretion in Mississippi, and they were each chosen in 
particular due to the amount of information available from various corroborated sources 
which has shown a lack of prosecutorial accountability and/or consequences for proven 
acts of misconduct.   
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Chapter 2 
Understanding the Extent of the Problem  
First, I will analyze available data and examine seven cases of injustice in the 
Mississippi Criminal Justice System, which collectively exhibit the problem of 
prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of power in Mississippi.  The power of the American 
prosecutor has been a thoroughly discussed variable in the still inexplicit equation for 
criminal justice in the United States (Bellin, 2019).  The first step in understanding just 
how impactful state prosecutors are on the lives of criminal defendants is learning the 
implicit difference in prosecutorial power and prosecutorial discretion. Essentially, 
discretion is the free choice that prosecutors are allowed when using their state-given 
powers to impose authority upon defendants (Davis, 2009).  The line dividing power and 
discretion is often incredibly blurred as there is substantial overlap in this context.  The 
ability to choose from a vast—or arguably infinite—array of options is what distinguishes 
prosecutors as powerful in a way other traditionally considered powerful government 
officials are not; discretion is not the same as power (Bellin, 2019).  This thesis focuses 
on the ability of prosecutors to abuse their discretion and suffer no professional 
consequences.  
In these case studies, I have focused on the means by which prosecutors can 
stretch the limits of their power through the use of discretion and suffer no professional 
consequences.  Some of these case studies feature the same leading prosecutor, while 
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others feature relevant attorneys or government officials aiding in the injustice.  The 
cases include defendants from an array of racial and socioeconomic backgrounds but are 
mostly comprised of racial minorities and people from disenfranchised communities.  
The analyses of the case studies also discuss the general attitude and disposition towards 
the actions of these prosecutors.   
As explained in the introduction, information about state prosecutors’ decisions 
and the reasons which drive them remains largely hidden from public view.  The 
available statistics on prosecutorial decision-making are recorded at the broadest level 
and effectively camouflages cases of abuse, systemic discrimination, and patterns which 
do not align with office policies.  This lack of transparency has earned prosecutors’ 
offices the reputation of being “black boxes” (Fortier, 2019).  The kinds of powers which 
prosecutors hold are not infinite, but when discretion is left unchecked, their powers 
create infinite possibilities—whether for the defendant or society overall.  Their powers 
begin with the (1) charging decision, including (1a) who to charge, if anyone at all, (1b) 
with what to charge them and whether to stack charges.  Next prosecutors decide (2) 
whether to offer a plea bargain, (2a) what plea bargain may be offered, and (2b) when the 
defendant must respond to the plea.  Should the accused accept the prosecutor’s offer and 
admit his/her guilt in exchange for a potentially lighter sentence, the defendant is ruled 
guilty and therefore has no right to appeal in the interest of innocence.   
Because most—97 percent of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases—end in 
plea bargains, there really is no way to estimate how many innocent people plead guilty 
out of fear of getting a worse sentence by trial, were not allowed knowledge of 
exculpatory evidence, or were unfairly coerced into the plea (Goode, 2012).  For this very 
 8 
reason, no cases of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of power through the plea-
bargaining process could be included in this thesis. Once a defendant pleads guilty, 
he/she gives up the right to appeal based on conviction, because—somewhat obviously—
a guilty plea is the defendant admitting his/her guilt in order to avoid the possibility of 
sentencing through a jury trial.  Therefore, cases of prosecutorial abuse of power or 
misconduct rarely come to light in plea bargain cases and do not exist in enough detail for 
this study.  
Should the accused choose to go to trial, the prosecutors are in control of the (3) 
composition of the case against them, including the powers to (4) choose expert or eye- 
witnesses to testify, and (5) offer incentives to witnesses—particularly “jailhouse” 
informants—in order to gain their testimonies.  Prosecutors are also considered (6) co-
investigators of their crimes, meaning they have the power to (6a) access, and (6b) 
evaluate the worth or relevance of evidence in a case (Davis, 2009).   
Much like any criminal justice official, prosecutors rely on their own discretion 
while making the very first decision in criminal cases, and all throughout to the last.  
With no guidelines or specific rules, there are infinitely many ways for prosecutors to 
design an outcome they particularly like.  Their choices in these decisions are almost 
purely discretionary and go virtually unreviewed.  Prosecutors also have resources and 
connections within the legal system which creates a huge power imbalance in a criminal 
trial when a defendant is given an overworked public defender (Levine et al., 2016).   
Prosecutors have the power (7) to exclude people from sitting on a jury, and they have 
complete control over the grand jury process, delaying or changing schedule as preferred.  
As the (8) sole interpreters of the court proceedings for the jury members by translating 
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legal terms, the general line of business, and direction of the trial for the jury, prosecutors 
hold great influence over the members of the jury, and jurors rarely act independently of 
the prosecutor (Davis, 2009).   
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Imbler v. Pachtman that prosecutors 
cannot be sued in civil courts for abuses of their powers, “no matter how severe.”  The 
Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) provides the standards 
of practice for judges, defense attorneys and prosecutors, but it is widely acknowledged 
that these standards are merely aspirational.  None of the actors of justice in this equation 
is required to follow, consider, or be disciplined from violating any of these standards.  
Only after one or more complaints against a prosecutor has been filed will a state Bar 
Association take into consideration the possibility of a prosecutor’s violation of justice 
(Davis, p. 15, 2009). The reason for this decision, is essentially the fact that prosecutorial 
power and discretion are necessary for the justice system to function in any relatively 
efficient way.  Prosecutors are law enforcement officers in court on behalf of the state or 
federal governments, and they play a huge role in the inherent functionality of the court 
system.  Police officers make the arrests and reports, but prosecutors take the cases from 
there, deciding whether a crime was committed and every decision involving 
incarceration afterward.  “In a world of scarcity, prosecutors are the key gatekeepers who 
ration criminal justice” (Bibas, 2010).  But scarcity of time and resources is not the only 
reason why prosecutorial discretion is so necessary to America’s—and by extent, 
Mississippi’s—criminal justice system.   
Discretion is key to functionality in our system because of the need for human 
contact, interaction, and experience.  Justice often requires extended periods of time to be 
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served.  In the meetings, hearings, and proceedings of a criminal case, the prosecutor 
becomes acquainted with the details of the case and must often make intimate and 
impactful decisions in care of those details.  Should the discretion be allocated to a more 
efficient or less-personal process, the criminal justice system would lose even more of the 
care and humanity so necessary for real, holistic justice.  However, these powers, which 
are so necessary to the overall system and so impactful on the lives of citizens, are not 
subject to review or consequences for their discretion at the prosecutorial stage.  As legal 
scholar Angela Davis writes, “legal exercise of prosecutorial discretion is largely 
responsible for the tremendous injustices in our criminal justice system” (Davis, p. 17, 
2009). The issue arises only when prosecutors abuse their discretion and powers and are 
not held accountable for the impacts they have on the lives of defendants and their 
families. Discretion, as aforementioned, is absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system; however, accountability—or lack thereof—is equally as 
impactful and problematic when it comes to truly seeking justice.  
Throughout this chapter, I have analyzed and summarized seven cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct and abuses of discretion in Mississippi, organized in Table 1 in 
the order which they appear in Chapter 2.  These cases were selected for analyzation 
based on the particular actions of the prosecutors in each respective case and the lack of 
professional or legal consequences for such actions. While these cases are far from the 
only cases of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of power in Mississippi, they collectively 
show the types of powers and discretionary decisions which prosecutors may abuse in 
order to obtain convictions but not justice.  Table 1 lists the name of the defendant, the 
year(s) during which the case took place, the name of the prosecutor, the location and 
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county in Mississippi, and the particular powers and discretionary actions which were 
subject to abuse in each respective case as listed and described in the beginning of this 
chapter.   
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Table 1  
Case Year(s) Location Prosecutor Power(s) Abused 
Curtis Flowers  
v.  
State of Mississippi 
1996 – current 
Winona, MS 
(Montgomery 
County) 
 
District Attorney 
Doug Evans 
#7 Selection of 
Jurors & 
 #4 Witnesses 
(Informants) 
Justin Blakeney 
v.  
State of Mississippi 
2010 – 2017 
Ellisville, MS 
(Jones 
County) 
District Attorney 
Anthony 
Buckley 
#1a Who to 
Charge, #4 
Witnesses 
(Informants), & #5 
Incentives 
Andreacchio 
Case  
2014 – current 
Meridian, MS 
(Lauderdale 
County) 
District Attorney 
Bilbo Mitchell 
#1a Who to 
Charge & #4 
Witnesses (Expert) 
Levon Brooks  
v.  
State of Mississippi 
1992 —2008 
Brooksville, 
MS 
(Noxubee 
County) 
District Attorney 
Forrest Allgood 
#4 Witness 
(Expert) & #6 
Investigation 
(Access to 
Evidence) 
Kennedy Brewer 
v.  
State of Mississippi 
1995 – 2001 
Brooksville, 
MS 
(Noxubee 
County) 
District Attorney 
Forrest Allgood 
#4 Witness 
(Expert) & #6 
Investigation 
(Access to 
Evidence) 
Sabrina Butler 
v.  
State of Mississippi  
1989 – 1995 
Columbus, 
MS 
(Lowndes 
County) 
District Attorney 
Forrest Allgood 
#1a Who to 
Charge & #8 Mis-
Leading the Jury 
Cedric Willis 
v.  
State of Mississippi 
1997 – 2006 
Jackson, MS 
(Hinds 
County) 
Circuit Court 
Judge 
Bobby 
DeLaughter & 
District Attorney 
Ed Peters 
#1a Who to 
Charge, #3 
Prosecuting Case, 
& #6b Evaluation 
of Evidence 
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Flowers v. State of Mississippi 
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused: 
#4 Witnesses (Informants) & #5 Witness Incentives & #7 Selection of Jurors 
A prime example of this unchecked power and immunity of prosecutors is the still 
ongoing criminal case of Curtis Flowers, an African American man in Winona, MS, who 
was charged with four murders at a local furniture store where he had previously worked.  
Early on the morning of July 1996, an employee at a small town, family-owned furniture 
store in Winona, MS, and found that four of his coworkers had been fatally shot.  The 
victims of the shooting at Tardy Furniture—owner and 59-year-old Bertha Tardy, 16-
year-old Derrick "Bobo" Stewart, 42-year-old Robert Golden, 45-year-old Carmen 
Rigby—were well-known and loved members of the town, and this was likely the most 
violent and shocking crime Winona had ever seen.  Understandably, local police, 
highway patrol investigators, and the district attorney were under much pressure from the 
tight-knit community to find and convict the killer, so when their investigation settled on 
one suspect, they were eager to convict.  Unlike the extremely vast majority of criminal 
cases in the US Criminal Justice System, this case did not end in a plea bargain.   
Maintaining his innocence for over two decades, Curtis Flowers went to trial and 
was convicted of the four murders at Tardy Furniture, but the case did not end there.  In 
fact, Flowers continued to win his appeals, be granted a new trial, and be convicted and 
sentenced to death six times over 23 years.  In each of these six trials, District Attorney 
Doug Evans has served as lead prosecutor, and throughout the past two decades, Curtis 
Flowers’s main residence has been on death row, and for multiple counts of prosecutorial 
misconduct throughout the trials, each conviction has been overturned or retried.  This 
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strange case made it back into headlines all over the United States in 2019, thanks to the 
podcast series In the Dark by APM Reports.  A team of investigative journalists lead by 
Madeleine Baran and Parker Yesko called the country’s attention back to the Tardy 
Furniture murders by conducting their own investigation into the murders, prosecutorial 
actions, and reasons behind the six overturned convictions under one prosecutor.  Baran 
succinctly summarizes the case as, “the story of a black man from a small town in 
Mississippi who has spent the past 21 years fighting for his life, and a white prosecutor 
who has spent that same time trying just as hard to execute him” (APM Reports, 2018).  
Eventually, Flowers’s lawyers appealed his case all the way to our nation’s highest court, 
and in August of 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Flowers a writ of 
certiorari and decided to hear his case—not to decide innocence or guilt, just to review 
his most recent trial and conviction, again.  
In a 7-2 ruling, the Justices revered Flowers’s conviction and decided that the 
district attorney and prosecutor Doug Evans—at least in this most recent trial—had 
violated Flowers’s constitutional rights by committing ‘Batson violations’ through 
intentionally removing African-Americans from the jury at the sixth trial, in 2010 
(Batson v. Kentucky, 2019).  And while the Justices’ decision was based only on 
Flowers’s sixth trial, Flowers’s lawyer Sheri Johnson of Cornell University’s Death 
Penalty Project made sure to include District Attorney Doug Evan’s history of using his 
power to strike potential African American members of the jury.  Throughout all six of 
Curtis Flowers’s trials, 61 of the 72 jurors were white.  “None of the four juries that 
convicted Flowers had more than one African-American.  Montgomery County, where 
the murders took place, is roughly 45 percent black,” (Baran & Yesko, 2019).   
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Unfortunately, racially segregating juries is not the end of prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case, but as previously mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court only 
reviewed Flowers’s case based on alleged and subsequently proven Batson violations in 
the sixth trial.  Altogether, four of Flowers’s six trials and convictions were overturned 
due to prosecutorial misconduct, and they were not all solely Batson violations.  In 1997, 
during Flowers’s first trial, Maurice Hawkins and Frederick Veal testified that Flowers 
had confessed to them in the Leflore County Jail of his guilt in the Tardy Furniture 
murders.  Their accounts of Flowers’s statements were completely inconsistent with each 
other and the facts of the case overall.   
Hawkins stated that one night in jail, Flowers told him that “He hate[d] [that] he 
had to kill his own cousin.”  The prosecution used this statement as an admission of guilt 
to Hawkins in trial, despite the fact that none of the victims at Tardy Furniture were in 
any way related to Flowers.  District Attorney Doug Evans also used Veal’s testimony in 
Flowers’s first trial, stating that Curtis had told him after he committed the murders, “He 
smoked some crack... I will say a thousand dollars’ worth.”  This statement was proven 
false in court when during cross-examination, Flowers’s defense attorney Billy Gilmore 
asked Veal, “Are you aware that the police picked [Flowers] up immediately after this, 
and they didn’t say anything about him being on crack?” Veal said he did not know this 
(Baran, 2019).  
Later in a sworn affidavit, Veal said the statement he gave while in jail and his 
subsequent testimony were crafted in the presence of the District Attorney and the case 
investigator, based on details they provided. “They couldn’t have believed it... I didn’t 
tell them that he confessed. They came to me and told me what to say,” Veal said.  And 
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in his affidavit to Curtis Flowers’ lawyers, Hawkins stated, “Flowers never told me that 
he killed anybody” (Baran, 2019).   
Prosecutors have the legal and ethical obligation to not only verify the truth of 
their witnesses’ statements, but also to report any doubt or evidence that an informant’s 
statements may not be true.  In addition, prosecutors are legally required to inform the 
court and the defense of any benefit promised to the informant or witness in exchange for 
his/her testimony, and in closing arguments of the first trial, Doug Evans said that 
Hawkins and Veal had “absolutely nothing to gain” from testifying for the prosecution.  
Later, in the affidavit, Hawkins said that he understood some pending charges against 
him would be dropped in exchange for his testimony, and Veal said under oath that he 
was convinced to testify by offers of leniency for his charges and even a cash reward, 
which he also said he never received.  Both witnesses claim these offers were their 
reasons for testifying to false information against Flowers in court (Baran, 2019).  
The offering of leniency or other kind of reward from prosecution in exchange for 
information from—especially criminal—informants is a common practice across the 
United States criminal justice system, and there is a widespread understanding among the 
incarcerated populations in America that coming forward with information will be 
rewarded. This type of bargain can lead to terribly unjust consequences. According to a 
2005 report by Northwestern University School of Law entitled “The Snitch System,” 
testimony of criminal informants is the leading cause of wrongful convictions in death 
penalty cases in the United States (Northwestern University, 2005).  
In recent years, several states have considered legislation that would subject the 
use of criminal informants to added scrutiny. These have included outright bans on 
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“snitches” in capital cases, pretrial reliability hearings, stricter caps on monetary benefits 
offered, and enhanced tracking and disclosure requirements, for instance, revealing how 
many previous cases an informant has testified in (Baran, 2019). But the former 
commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as well as former police chief 
of Jackson, Robert Johnson believed jailhouse informants should not be automatically 
disregarded. “There’s a heavy duty to check out the information and determine whether 
or not it's legitimate,” he said (Baran, 2019). “You have to be skeptical, but that's not 
saying you reject all the information.”  Johnson added that investigators and prosecutors 
should not be allowed to send inmates into cells specifically to extract a confession. 
“That’s a tactic that's suspect in my estimation and really shouldn't be used. If there’s 
information that comes your way from a random assignment of people from a cell, then 
that’s fine. But to do that with the specific intent of soliciting information is ripe for 
abuse.”  
While it is true that very few criminal cases are tried in court six times, the case of 
Curtis Flowers—or, more accurately in terms of this paper, Doug Evans—serves as just 
one example of the real extent of prosecutor power.  Eventually, all of Flowers’s appeals, 
hearings, trials, and help from the media pushed his case all the way up to the Supreme 
Court.  While the decision was in favor of Flowers, our most sacred court did not quite 
set the record straight.  If the Supreme Court decided Doug Evans was prosecuting 
unfairly, surely there would be some other repercussion than yet another overturned 
conviction. Or, should Doug Evans be disciplined somehow?  Actually, the Supreme 
Court made the same decision the lower courts had been making this whole time, 
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overturning convictions—not acquitting Flowers, but sending him back to the stage of 
indictment.  
As for district attorney and prosecutor Doug Evans, general counsel for the 
Mississippi Bar Adam Kilgore said that he could not confirm nor deny any existence of a 
bar complaint.  He also told reporters, “Presently, he [Doug Evans] is active and in good 
standing…. A case just being reversed does not automatically mean that an attorney has 
committed an ethics violation” (Ross, 2019).  This means the case goes back to Winona, 
and back in the hands of district attorney Doug Evans, again. Evans is running unopposed 
for re-election in 2019, and as of June 2019, the Mississippi Bar has corroborated 
Kilgore’s statement in confirming Evans’s “good standing” (APM Reports, 2019).  Not 
just a prosecutor, but a District Attorney, was found guilty of misconduct in the highest 
court of our nation, and other than having to endure some public embarrassment, he 
remains professionally unaffected in the highest degree.  This, sadly, is not surprising.  
Mississippi elected officials are seldom removed from office or disciplined by more than 
a letter to the editor or nasty campaign ad from their opposition.  
Justin Barrett Blakeney v. Mississippi 
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused:  
Powers #1a Who to Charge, #4 Witnesses (Informants), & #5 Incentives  
Another example of a prosecutor’s discretion, use of incentivizing informants, and 
immunity for his/her such choices is that of Justin Blakeney v. State of Mississippi.  On 
August 10, 2010, Justin Barrett Blakeney called 911 to report that his girlfriend’s two-
year-old daughter Victoria Viner (“V.V.”) had collapsed and was non-responsive.  
Blakeney and V.V.'s mother Linda Viner had been dating for eight months and living 
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together for approximately six months. V.V. had attended daycare when Blakeney first 
moved in, but in an effort to save money, Blakeney began babysitting V.V. at home 
because he did not work at the time.  Blakeney would watch V.V. from around 10 a.m. 
when Viner left for work until around 2 p.m. when Viner returned home. 
On this particular morning, V.V. was still asleep in her crib at the time Viner left 
for work, and around 10:30 a.m. Blakeney saw that V.V. was awake. “Blakeney stated 
that he noticed that V.V. had squinted her eyes and thought that she had a headache. 
Blakeney picked her up from her crib and placed V.V. on the floor. He began walking 
into the kitchen with V.V. following behind. Blakeney stated that he had taken two steps 
into the kitchen when he heard what sounded like a loud thump. Blakeney turned around 
and saw V.V. lying face down on the carpet. When Blakeney picked her up, V.V. was 
unresponsive and limp. V.V. then began to tense and clench both her fists to her chest. 
Blakeney called 911 and then called Viner at work. Viner also called 911 and, when 
asked if V.V. had been having medical problems lately, stated that V.V. had been 
throwing up and had been cranky. Viner stated that she had been giving V.V. Tylenol 
because she had not felt well” (Justin Blakeney v. State of Mississippi, 2017).  
At the hospital, V.V. was diagnosed with a diffuse injury throughout her brain.  
She was taken off life support and pronounced dead on August 12, 2010.  Her death was 
ruled a homicide, caused by blunt force trauma to her head at the hands of Blakeney, who 
was subsequently charged with her murder.  The prosecution, led by District Attorney J. 
Buckley, enlisted the help of two jailhouse informants, Gregory “Hobo” Hancock and 
Randall “Satan” Smith.  With the assistance of these two informants, the prosecution 
developed the theory that Blakeney murdered V.V. in order to become a member of the 
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Aryan Brotherhood, a notorious white supremacist gang to which both informants 
belonged.  The prosecution used both informants to gain evidence of Blakeney’s 
supposed plan, and both Hancock and Smith were currently working on behalf of the 
State to incriminate Blakeney when they first engaged in conversation with him working 
on behalf of the State to elicit incriminating evidence to provide to the prosecution. 
The prosecution only notified the defense of its intent to use Hancock, Smith, and 
three previously undisclosed expert witnesses less than two weeks before the start of the 
trial; and although the defense filed a motion for a continuance, the trial court denied the 
motion, and the trial commenced as scheduled.  At trial, Hancock and Smith testified and 
their statements to police were admitted into evidence.  Even though there was no 
evidence that Blakeney had any interest in joining the Aryan Brotherhood prior to the 
death of V.V., he was convicted of her murder and sentenced to death.  During his 
appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court began its review by noting that capital murder 
cases are subject to greater scrutiny than other types of cases, explaining, “we have long 
taken a different approach in reviewing capital cases.  In such matters, we employ a 
higher level of scrutiny.”  The Court reversed Blakeney’s conviction and specified 
several errors made at trial, as well as counts of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The first error the Court noted was that the trial court should have granted a 
continuance to Blakeney and his attorneys when the prosecution notified him of its intent 
to use Smith and other undisclosed witnesses so close to the start of the trial.  The Court 
concluded that because “the prosecution’s late disclosure of previously undisclosed 
witnesses left the defense without adequate time to prepare, we find that a continuance 
should have been granted.”  Second, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that both 
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Hancock and Smith were working for the State when they first spoke with Blakeney, and 
his right to counsel had already attached.  This means that, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), a defendant may not be 
interrogated without a lawyer once the right to counsel has attached, unless he or she 
waives that right.  Hancock and Smith’s objective to obtain incriminating evidence on 
Blakeney as agents of the State “amounts to secret interrogations that were equivalent to 
direct police interrogations, which is expressly prohibited by Massiah.”  The Mississippi 
Supreme Court concluded that admitting the evidence obtained by the informants 
violated Blakeney’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
The third reason the Court cited as a means to reverse Blakeney’s conviction was 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The Court concluded that the prosecution engaged in 
misconduct when they failed provide the defense with the results of the ATF’s electronic 
evaluation of cellphones and computers found in Blakeney’s residence.  The prosecution 
claimed that there was no exculpatory evidence and then disposed of the material; 
however, the Court rejected that explanation, reasoning that any evidence found on the 
electronic devices could have supported Blakeney’s claim that only after V.V.’s death 
and his own imprisonment did Blakeney attempt to join the Aryan Brotherhood for 
protection in prison.  Because the prosecution threw out the evidence, whether it was 
exculpatory is unknown, but his alleged desire to join the Aryan Brotherhood could not 
have been the motive for killing V.V.  
Suppression of exculpatory evidence violates the defendant’s due process rights 
regardless of whether it was done in good faith or bad faith.  However, this case presents 
a slightly more complex situation because the material at issue may or may not have been 
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exculpatory.  Thus, this case requires a showing of bad faith by the prosecution to 
constitute a violation of due process, as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).  The Mississippi Supreme Court did determine that the 
actions by the prosecution in handling the evidence was in bad faith. Undoubtedly, if 
there had been any incriminating evidence found in the electronic material, the 
prosecution would have used it against Blakeney; therefore, it is more likely that 
evidence which undermined the prosecution’s theory of motive was found in the 
electronic evidence, so the prosecution’s disposal of the material did constitute bad faith.  
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the three foregoing reversible errors denied 
Blakeney the opportunity to present a complete defense, and consequently, the Court 
reversed his conviction and sentence and remanded his case for a new trial on the merits 
(Gates, 2017).  
Andreacchio  
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused:  
Power #1 Who to Charge #4 Witnesses (Expert) 
To best get a taste for the political and social environment of Mississippi, a 
recording of Captain Jay Arrington of the Meridian Police District—in a leaked secret 
recording which was later published in the Culpable podcast series—stated, “I’ve had 
cases where police shoot an unarmed guy in the back that aren’t pursued [by the district 
attorney].  I got [a case of] a cop that was getting a big TV from Best Buy and forging the 
credit out, that wasn’t pursued because he was a good baseball player in high school.”  
This next case study shows exactly how deeply the nepotism and political networks run 
in Mississippi.   
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Important here to mention is that people of color and racial minorities are not the 
only consistent victims of the Mississippi Criminal Justice System.  On February 26, 
2014, in Meridian, MS, 22-year old Christian Andreacchio was found dead in the 
bathroom of his apartment from a single gunshot wound to the head.  Andreacchio’s 
girlfriend Whitley Goodman and his friend Dylan Swearingen were both at the apartment 
that day.  Andreacchio was supposed to be working offshore on a tug boat but had come 
home because of an apparent fight with Goodman.  After just 45-minute investigation by 
Meridian police, then-police chief James Lee arrived at the scene, stopped the 
investigation, and ruled Christian’s death a suicide, all despite the clear and substantial 
evidence indicating Christian’s death was in fact a homicide and possibly premeditated 
murder.  The crime scene was altogether inconsistent.  Christian’s position was 
inconsistent with his state of rigor mortis when police arrived, as well as the position of 
the gun, blood spatter, and bullet hole location in the wall.  Even the coroner ruled his 
cause of death as “undetermined,” which should instinctively raise red flags about the 
incredibly quick investigation.  Witness statements contradicted and confused the 
situation the more they were collected.  And neither Goodman nor Swearingen were 
questioned by investigators, despite the positive results of gunshot residue on both of 
their hands, as well as Goodman’s theft of Christian’s cell phone—which she initially 
stated could not be found, only to produce it from her purse when later questioned.  His 
family has spent the past six years hiring private investigators and lawyers to convince 
and prove to state and local law enforcement agencies that Christian’s death was not 
suicide.  
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Before recusing himself in February 2017, for being “too close to the family,” 
District Attorney Bilbo Mitchell was the prosecutor assigned to Andreacchio’s case, and, 
for all intents and purposes, successfully managed to stop any progress in the case.  
Although the state of Mississippi’s forensic crime lab is seriously underfunded and has 
not been able to take on any new cases, Mitchell refused to allow the Andreacchio family 
to outsource a forensic lab to analyze the DNA sample on the trigger of Christian’s gun 
(Fowler, 2018).  When they finally were allowed to outsource, Mitchell called a few 
connections and told them “to hold up on the DNA testing until he had talked to Knox & 
Associates (crime scene re-constructionists hired by the Andreacchios) because if they 
had enough to take to grand jury he was just going to go with what they had” (Royal, 
2017).   
The Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood’s office took over the case at 
Mitchell’s request, and although there was an attempt to indict Goodman and Swearingen 
for “culpable negligence,” no further progress has been made in establishing legal 
responsibility for Christian Andreacchio’s death (Cooper, 2019).  His mother Rae 
Andreacchio has an ongoing petition to move the MS Department of Justice to 
investigate the multiple agencies for “corruption and conspiracy engaged in by multiple 
individuals in efforts to circumvent justice for Christian's murder” (Andreacchio, 2019).  
Through 24 episodes of the investigative podcast Culpable, the Andreacchio family has 
accumulated vast amounts of evidence supporting their accusations of corruption and 
conspiracy against Mississippi government and legal officials.  These names include 
former DA Bilbo Mitchell, current DA Kassie Coleman, AG Prosecutor Marvin Sanders, 
AG Investigator Gypsi Ward, AG Investigator Roger Wade, and Director of the AG 
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Public Integrity Unit Tony Green.  These are prosecutors and officers of the court who 
have obstructed justice and will not face consequences for it.  
Levon Brooks v. State of Mississippi 
& 
Kennedy Brewer v. State of Mississippi 
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused:  
#4 Witness (Expert) & #6 Investigation (Access to Evidence) 
The University of Mississippi School of Law has worked with national and local 
sects of The Innocence Project to develop The George C. Cochran Innocence Project in 
Mississippi.  The Project is committed to providing legal representation to Mississippi 
state prisoners who have served significant periods of incarceration and have “cognizable 
claims” of wrongful conviction.  The Project has also provided explicitly documented 
cases of prosecutorial misconduct and injustices in the Mississippi criminal justice 
system.  The Innocence Project has aided in the exonerations of many wrongfully 
convicted men and women in Mississippi, but the cases of Levon Brooks and Kennedy 
Brewer in particular reveal the frightening inner-workings of prosecutors and their 
witnesses.  These two cases share many similarities, including the same crime modus 
operandi (MO), prosecutor, and forensics expert.  
On September 15, 1990, three-year-old Courtney Smith was asleep in her 
bedroom which she shared with her six-year-old and one-year-old sisters, and her 26-
year-old uncle was asleep in the next room.  At a late hour in the night, Smith was 
abducted from her home in Brooksville, Mississippi.  Two days later, her body was found 
in a pond near her house.  She had been brutally sexually assaulted and strangled to 
 26 
death.  Levon Brooks became a suspect in the case initially because of his ties to Smith’s 
family as he had previously dated her mother.  Dr. Steven Hayne—a now-disgraced but 
once revered Mississippi pathologist—performed an autopsy on Smith and found 
possible bite marks on her wrist.  He then referred the case to Dr. Michael West, a 
similarly renounced forensic dentist in Mississippi, who had often worked with Hayne on 
other cases in the past.  West confirmed that the marks on Smith’s body were from 
human teeth.  More than a week later, law enforcement interviewed Smith’s six-year-old 
sister who said she had seen the abduction take place, and based on the girl’s 
identification, Levon Brooks was arrested and charged with capital murder.  Brooks was 
tried in Noxubee County, Mississippi, in January 1992.  The lead prosecutor District 
Attorney Forrest Allgood used the unreliable testimony of the victim’s 6-year-old sister, 
claiming that the child had known Brooks and was sure she saw him abduct her sister.  
Allgood’s case also relied upon the “expert” Dr. West, who went on to testify at Brook’s 
trial that two of Brooks’ teeth “indeed and without a doubt…matched” the marks on the 
victim’s body, and “it could be no one but Levon Brooks that bit this girl’s arm.”  Levon 
Brooks received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
Just two years later, an eerily similar and horrifying abduction and murder took 
place.  In the early morning of May 3, 1992, three-year-old Christine Jackson—whose 
mother, Gloria Jackson, was dating Kennedy Brewer at the time—was abducted from her 
home in Noxubee County, raped, and murdered.  On this particular evening, Brewer was 
babysitting Christine and her two younger siblings, both of whom were Brewer’s 
biological children with Gloria.  Just as in Courtney Smith’s case, Christine was found 
two days after her abduction in a creek near her home.  Because there was no sign of 
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forced entry, police suspected Brewer. District Attorney Forrest Allgood theorized that 
Brewer had sexually assaulted and murdered Jackson in her home and carried her body to 
the creek after the fact; however, Allgood disregarded the broken window near the child’s 
bedroom where an intruder could have entered and exited undetected with the child.  
Brewer’s trial began in March 1995, and although a semen sample had been taken from 
the crime scene, it was deemed insufficient for DNA testing.  Allgood once again called 
upon Dr. Steven Hayne, who claimed to have found bite marks on the victim and referred 
the case to Dr. West. West concluded that 19 bite marks found on the victim’s body were 
“indeed and without a doubt” inflicted by Brewer, further testifying that all 19 marks 
were made only by Brewer’s top two teeth and his bottom teeth had made no impression.  
As it turned out, none of the marks on Christine’s body were proven to be bite marks at 
all; in fact, some of the marks were proven to actually have been caused Dr. West’s 
method of pressing denture-like molds of Brewer’s teeth into Christine’s skin (York, 
2019).  Unfortunately, the testimonies of Dr. Hayne and Dr. West were basis of the 
prosecution’s case against both Brooks and Brewer, and their testimonies were enough to 
convince a judge and jury of their guilt.  Brewer was found guilty and sentenced to death. 
Of the roughly 60 people on death row in Mississippi, Dr. West has testified as an 
expert witness in about 40 of those cases.  West proclaimed his findings to be so certain 
in each of his analyses that the scientific community began calling his work into question 
and discrediting him by the time of Brewer’s trial.  Although Dr. West was the first 
member ever to be suspended from the American Board of Forensic Odontology, the 
court allowed his testimony for decades.  In addition, Dr. Hayne, who was never certified 
by the American Board of Pathology—meaning he neither passed his pathology exam 
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requirements nor completed his residency and fellowship training—repeatedly testified in 
court that he was board certified, committing perjury on the witness stand in each of his 
testimonies.  However, at the time of both of these trials and for decades overall, Dr. 
Hayne was the “go-to, de facto” pathologist for most of the state of Mississippi (Smith, 
2018).  
District Attorney Forrest Allgood and the courts of Mississippi have the 
responsibility and obligation to ensure expert witness testimony is, in fact, the testimony 
of an expert witness and not the falsified or preferred results of law enforcement.  
According to the co-founder of the national Innocence Project, Peter Neufeld, Allgood 
has put more people on death row than any current, working prosecutor in the state 
(York, 2019).  Brooks and Brewer are just two of the many cases he has prosecuted, and 
they justifiably raise questions about the lack of accountability in prosecutorial procedure 
in Mississippi.  Leroy Riddick, a state medical examiner in Alabama who has testified in 
opposition to Hayne, has repeatedly explained that, “All of the prosecutors in Mississippi 
know that if you want to be sure to get the autopsy results you want, you take the body to 
Dr. Hayne” (Balko, 2007).   During both of these cases, Allgood stood by the testimonies 
of Dr. Hayne and Dr. West, despite the growing doubt of their scientific legitimacy.  
Allgood continued to employ both doctors in his cases, long after they had both been 
widely considered frauds (Balko, 2015).   
In fact, when the national Innocence Project learned of Brewer’s case and decided 
to look into it, they also found Brook’s case.  To the lawyers in the national Innocence 
Project, it was obvious that the abduction and murders of Courtney Smith and Christine 
Jackson had the same modus operandi and were committed by the same person, a serial 
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pedophile and murderer.  Both cases were child abductions with similar sexual assault 
strangulation patterns, and afterwards the victims were deposited in bodies of water.  
When this was brought to the attention of law enforcement in MS, it was immediately 
dismissed as impossible.  Peter Neufeld stated, “They said ‘it couldn’t be the same 
person, because we had the first guy locked up when the second one happened’” (York, 
2019).  Both crimes actually were committed by the same person, Justin Albert Johnson.  
Although he was a suspect in both cases who gave DNA samples to law enforcement as 
well, he was not the man Forrest Allgood wanted to prosecute at the time.  Although in 
2001, DNA evidence exonerated Brewer, District Attorney Forrest Allgood spent years 
fighting against both Brook’s and Brewer’s appeals, defending their convictions, and 
indefinitely keeping them from justice.  Because of Allgood’s adamant actions to obstruct 
justice, Brewer remained in prison for seven more years after DNA proved his innocence.   
After the Brooks and Brewer cases, the Innocence Project attempted to have 
Hayne’s medical license revoked.  Hayne responded by filing a defamation lawsuit, 
which was settled in 2012.  Hayne and his supporting prosecutors blamed his inaccurate 
toxicology and lab reports on a lab in Texas, called ExperTox, which had performed the 
tests.  ExperTox described Hayne’s “sloppy methods” and told the Jackson Clarion-
Ledger newspaper that the lab had already ceased any work with Mississippi prosecutors.  
They stated, “We didn’t feel as comfortable with samples coming from that state as we 
did with other states” (Balko, 2014).  During the discovery phase of the defamation 
lawsuit, the Innocence Project discovered new information about Hayne and the way the 
state’s prosecutors, coroners, and judges encouraged and knowingly protected his fallible 
work for decades.   
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The Mississippi Innocence Project, headed by Tucker Carrington, compiled a 
dossier on Hayne, eventually filing pleadings in four cases in which Hayne’s testimony 
was both critical to securing the conviction and has since been disproved by other 
medical examiners.  Of the four cases, three were in the post-conviction phase, meaning 
the convicted had exhausted all of his/her appeals.  Neufeld stated that West “deliberately 
fabricated evidence and conclusions which were not supported by the evidence, the data 
or the rules of science but … because they were consistent with the prosecutor's theory” 
(The Innocence Project, 2008).  As explained before, prosecutors have the legal and 
ethical obligation to not only verify the truth of their witnesses’ statements, but also to 
report any doubt or evidence that an informant’s statements may not be true.  The 
prosecutor’s decision to not only choose but to also actively defend the testimony of 
debunked “experts” should be seriously questioned if not disciplined in some way.  
In these two cases, it is very clear that the justice system did not work; however, 
according to District Attorney Allgood, “Nobody wants to put the wrong guy in jail or 
execute the wrong guy… [but] in a very real sense, in these two cases, the system did 
work.  Nobody died.”  Though his logic here may seem intact—because both Brooks and 
Brewer were eventually freed—someone did die because of these actions.  If Courtney’s 
death had been properly handled and prosecuted, or if Allgood had not actively worked 
against the hearings of Brook’s appeals, Christine Jackson might never have been killed.  
In addition, and just as importantly, if Allgood had not abused his discretion and powers 
as a prosecutor, these two innocent men would not have lost years of their lives to 
wrongful incarceration, and they would not have to carry with them the stigma and 
psychological trauma of being imprisoned.  
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Sabrina Butler v. State of Mississippi 
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused:  
Power #1a Who to Charge & #8 Misleading the Jury 
On April 12, 1989, 17-year-old Sabrina Butler realized her nine-month-old son, 
Walter, had stopped breathing.  She attempted to resuscitate him, then quickly rushed him 
to the Columbus hospital where he was pronounced dead.  Butler reported to medical 
professionals and police her account of finding the child not breathing and her 
unsuccessful resuscitation attempts.  Walter’s autopsy revealed that his obviously swollen 
stomach was due to severe internal injuries and bleeding.  Dr. Hicks, the pathologist who 
performed the autopsy, stated that these injuries were caused by some type of blunt 
trauma, or “substantial blunt force to the abdomen” (One For Ten, 2012).  For hours 
following the death of her child, Butler was questioned by medical personnel and police.  
She gave multiple contradicting statements, but ultimately transcribed and signed a 
statement in which she confessed to abusing and killing Walter.  Less than 24 hours after 
Walter died, Sabrina Butler was charged with capital murder for the death of her nine-
month-old son.  When filing the murder charge, the law enforcement said they were 
aware of her obvious grief and her diagnosis of being “borderline mentally retarded 
[sic],” but decided to disregard its effects along with any effects of her grief when 
evaluating the accuracy of Butler’s statement (Balko, 2014).   
 In 1989, Butler was indicted by the grand jury of Lowndes County, for capital 
murder in the killing of Walter Dean Butler “while engaged in the commission of 
felonious child abuse and/or battery of the child” (One For Ten, 2012).  She was 
convicted and sentenced to lethal injection in a jury trial on March 8, 1990.  District 
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Attorney Forrest Allgood served as the prosecuting attorney for the state of Mississippi, 
and in the closing argument, Allgood made comments upon Butler's failure to take the 
stand in her own trial, such as:   
“Ladies and Gentlemen, that is an admission of guilt, but I submit to you 
she hasn’t told you the whole truth yet… Ladies and Gentlemen, those 
bruises were not inflicted by the same wound that created the massive 
internal injuries that subsequently killed this child. It could not have 
happened. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, she has not yet told you the whole 
truth of the torment she subjected her son to.  You still don’t know the whole 
story.  Incredible, unbelievable evasion from start to finish. Ladies and 
Gentlemen, is that what an innocent person does?” (One For Ten, 2012).  
Despite objections from Butler’s defense counsel, these remarks were permitted 
by the trial judge, Ernest Brown, so Sabrina Butler was convicted and sentence to death 
for the murder of her nine-month-old son.  On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
Butler’s conviction was overturned on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, as 
District Attorney Forrest Allgood instructed jurors to assume guilt from Butler’s failure 
to testify.  These comments misled the jury and consequently denied Sabrina Butler her 
constitutional rights to due process.  The Supreme Court also noted in its opinion that 
while prosecutors may comment on the weight and worth of the evidence in a case, 
including the various statements made by the defendant, District Attorney Forrest 
Allgood  
“still had a clear duty to refrain carefully from making any remark which 
directly or indirectly drew the jury’s attention to the fact that Butler did not 
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take the stand… The prosecution could hardly have made the point plainer 
if it had simply come out and said ‘There is a lot more to tell, but Butler has 
not seen fit to get on the witness stand and tell you” (Sabrina Butler v. State 
of Mississippi, 1990).  
The Justices’ decision held Allgood’s remarks in this case to be “an error, so 
egregious in fact that even if there had been no objection at trial, [the Court] would 
nevertheless have been obligated to reverse” (One For Ten, 2012).  Forrest Allgood’s 
name has now come up in this thesis a number of times in multiple cases, making one ask 
exactly question this thesis is asking: how can a prosecutor make these kinds of decisions 
for so long and never be stopped or held accountable.   
Cedric Willis v. The State of Mississippi 
Power(s) and Point(s) of Discretion Abused:  
Powers #1 Who to Charge, #3 Prosecuting Case, & #6b Evaluation of Evidence 
In 1994, the city of Jackson, MS, experienced a spree of violent armed robberies.  
Within five days of each other, during two of these robberies, the assailant raped a 
woman and murdered Carl White, Jr.  Ballistics reports showed that the same gun was 
used in each of the crimes as well as in three other armed robberies occurring within two 
hours of White’s murder.  After his photograph had been shown to the victims off of an 
alleged tip received by Jackson police, the victims from both crimes mistakenly identified 
19-year-old Cedric Willis as the assailant; and despite absolutely no physical evidence, 
Willis was arrested for the two robberies including the rape and murder.  A year after his 
arrest, DNA testing of the rape kit taken from the rape victim proved Willis was not the 
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rapist.  The prosecutors of the case decided to drop the rape charges and try Willis only 
for the murder and robbery of Carl White, Jr. and his family.   
They pushed for conviction, asking that the jury not hear that DNA evidence had 
excluded Willis from a crime which involved the same gun that killed Carl White, Jr., or 
that this same gun was used in three other robberies within two hours of his murder to 
which Cedric Willis could not have been connected.  The jury only heard the heart-
wrenching testimony of the victims, and the prosecutors won a conviction, sentencing 
Cedric Willis to life in prison, plus 90 years.  Willis served nearly 12 years in prison 
before the Innocence Project of New Orleans began investigating his case in 2004 and 
helped him prove his innocence.  New Orleans Innocence Project Director Emily Maw 
frequently encounters wrongful convictions and works to correct them, often through 
mistaken witness identification or accidentally mishandled evidence.  What she 
encountered in the case of Cedric Willis was something considerably more insidious. The 
Jackson Free Press reported in 2006 that former Hinds County District Attorney Ed 
Peters and his then-assistant district attorney, Bobby DeLaughter, excluded DNA 
evidence in 1994 that would have likely exonerated Willis of the crime.  Maw said she 
suspects Peters and DeLaughter knew the DNA evidence would throw their conviction 
and successfully appealed to Judge Breland Hilburn to dump it (WLBT, 2009).  
The two prosecutors Ed Peters and Bobby Delaughter who tried Cedric Willis 
were never disciplined for their misconduct or obstruction of justice in this case.  
Although—true to their characters—both lost their law licenses in an unrelated criminal 
investigation by the federal government, and Delaughter was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison on a federal obstruction of justice charge.  So while Delaughter and Peters were 
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punished for some misconduct within their positions, they suffered no consequences for 
their prosecution of Cedric Willis.  
These cases which were shown at the beginning of Chapter 2 in Table 1 and 
analyzed throughout the chapter are not the only incidences of such injustices in the state, 
but they are the ones which have been recognized over past decades and exhibit the lack 
of prosecutorial accountability which allows for such injustices to continue.  From these 
cases, we have learned that there is a problem within the Mississippi criminal justice 
system that shields errant prosecutors from consequences for abusing their discretion.  In 
the next chapter, I will present the framework through which I will attempt to mitigate 
this problem by evaluating policy proposals with a novel grading rubric.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology: How to Solve the Problem 
In searching for a way to address this potential abuse, I scoured academic and 
legal journals from universities and research institutions for policy proposals which 
attempt to address these particular powers while also respecting their necessity in the 
justice system.  The three chosen policies are those which are aimed most directly at 
addressing the risks of prosecutorial discretion in Mississippi as explained in Chapter 2.  
The policy proposals show a range of potential reforms and solutions.  They are 
categorized based on their individual method of approaching the problems being 
addressed.  The categories include (1) requiring more transparency and data collection of 
Mississippi prosecutors’ decisions, (2) judicial review and disciplinary reform, and (3) 
creating Conviction Integrity Units and Best Practices Committees to review the actions 
of prosecutors.  In my research, I have found that most judicial reforms which attempt to 
reduce the risks of prosecutorial discretion fall under these three policy approaches—
excluding a few radical proposals or any from vastly different court systems.  The 
specific articles chosen from each category are those which were accompanied by ample 
and recent research and/or empirical data and have been implemented in closely similar 
ways in state courts across the country.    
These proposals will be valued based on their expected impacts on the 
reconciliation of the need for prosecutorial discretion and its subsequent risks.  I will also 
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be evaluating these policies based on the likelihood of their respective implementation in 
Mississippi, where many—if not most—of the state officials are the perpetuates for such 
stagnant progress in Mississippi’s economic and social standing.   The standards by 
which I evaluate and rank these proposals will be according to a set rubric of ideal policy 
goals and implications.  These proposals are then scored and ranked based on how well 
each individual policy theoretically meets each of the standards.  There are three 
standards by which the proposals are scored, all equally weighted as they are each of the 
same importance in the implementation of a solution.  The three standards are efficacy, 
equity, and feasibility.  These standards were chosen in particular because together they 
capture the overall goal of what a criminal justice reform policy would need to achieve to 
become a successful policy.  Should a policy be ineffective in solving the problem at 
hand, unequitable in its impacts, or unfeasible in its implementation, the policy would fail 
to truly better the Mississippi criminal justice system or do much more than add to the 
bureaucratic red-tape in the state.  The overall goal of each standard is explained through 
a respective subset of questions which will be asked of each proposal in order to evaluate 
if and how well the policies achieve the standards.   
The policies are graded on a 4-point scale according to if and how well they 
achieve each of the three standards: (1) Not at All (2) Not Well, (3) Moderately Well, or 
(4) Very Well.  The policies’ cumulative scores are the averages (means) of their three 
standard whole number scores—the higher the score the better the policy.  For example, 
if Policy X was an effective policy in that it would create a system by which prosecutors 
were undoubtedly held more accountable for their discretionary decisions, Policy X 
would receive a score of 3 or 4 in Efficacy, depending on the details and theoretical 
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impacts of the policy.  If the implementation of Policy X would create greater equity 
among prosecutors’ decisions while also reducing protections and anonymity of 
witnesses or victims, the policy would receive a score of 2 or 3 in Equity. Further, if the 
implementation of the policy was unsustainably expensive or otherwise infeasible, the 
policy would receive a score of 1 or 2 in Feasibility—similarly explained by greater 
detail and analysis of the policy. 
After analyzing the specifics of prosecutorial misconduct in Mississippi as well as 
proposed policies, this thesis will tailor (and/or combine) the most appropriate and 
highest scoring policy (or policies) according to the rubric in order to address the problem 
of prosecutorial misconduct in Mississippi.   
Figure 1 
 
Policy Grading Scale: How well does the policy meet each standard? 
 
 
Three Standards:  
Efficacy 
• Does the policy prevent or discourage prosecutors from abusing their power?  
The policy approaches the risks of prosecutorial discretion in decision-making in 
a way which may either prevent prosecutors from abusing their powers completely or 
discourage them from abuse of power through a deterrent method. The policy must also 
(1) Not at All
(2) Not Well
(3) Moderately Well
(4) Very Well
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address and resolve cases of proven prosecutorial misconduct and unjust discretionary 
decisions in a retroactive disciplinary measure.  The policy should address the risks of 
prosecutorial discretion in a way which secures greater measures of accountability and/or 
prescribed consequences for any unjust discretionary decisions in the Mississippi 
criminal justice system.  A successful policy recommendation, when implemented, would 
ensure that the Mississippi criminal justice system is achieving its goal to find justice, not 
just secure convictions.  A policy which fails to bring the attention of prosecutors to the 
impacts of their potentially reckless discretion or does not hold prosecutors more 
accountable for such decisions will receive a lower score when evaluated.  
Equity 
• Does the policy negatively impact one (social, racial, etc.) group more than 
another? 
Equity refers to carrying out justice system activities with proper regard for 
equality, fairness, proportionality, and constitutional protections afforded to defendants 
and convicted offenders.  A successful policy would address the risks of prosecutorial 
discretion in a way which would increase the equality and equity of decisions and 
outcomes for all criminal defendants under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi criminal 
justice system.  A policy which does not tighten the disparity gap of criminal justice 
outcomes between defendants from disenfranchised communities and those from more 
fortunate backgrounds will be scored lower in the evaluation; further, if the 
implementation of the policy would result in disparate or unfavorable outcomes for any 
population subgroup, the policy will receive a lower score. 
• Will it increase equity among decisions in the justice system? 
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The policy must assure equal treatment and handling of like offenders and 
charges, giving equal weight to legally relevant factors in sentencing.  The policy 
proposal must allow for greater review of cases and outcomes to ensure equitable 
decisions in charging and sentencing are being made for like offenders.  A policy which 
fails to be equitable or achieve a greater level of equity among decisions and outcomes of 
the prosecutors and the Mississippi criminal justice system as a whole, the policy will be 
scored lower in the evaluation. 
Feasibility 
• Could/Would the policy be passed by the Mississippi governing bodies?  
The policy must be politically feasible, meaning the Mississippi legislature or 
government entity would be convinced of the necessity and propriety of the policy 
enough to legislate or implement the policy.  The issue that arises pertaining to the 
feasibility of adopting new policies or legislation in the state of Mississippi is that those 
who have the power to enact change either do not believe in the existence or prevalence 
of the problem or they themselves are proponents of the problem.  A feasible policy 
would likely be accepted and supported by government officials in Mississippi, such as 
the state legislature, state Supreme Court, or other government office with the proper 
jurisdiction.  If a policy theoretically would not likely be accepted or supported by the 
necessary government officials, the policy will receive a lower score in feasibility. 
• Does the policy allow the justice system to function effectively? 
Rates of crime and recidivism have long served as critical measures for the 
performance of the nation’s criminal justice system.  Lower crime rates and fewer 
instances of repeat offenders represent the basic goals of public safety to which all 
 41 
components of the criminal justice system theoretically contribute; however, rates of 
crime and recidivism are not the only, nor necessarily the best, measures of what criminal 
justice institutions do.  Effective criminal justice systems are capable of investigating and 
adjudicating criminal offences effectively and impartially, while ensuring that the rights 
of suspects and victims are protected (OECD, 2015).  They ensure that state and local law 
enforcement receive the funding, training, and support from the federal and state 
governments at the level needed to serve the communities and to promote safety and 
wellness.  The administration of criminal justice in the United States and in Mississippi 
calls for economically applying available resources to accomplish statutory goals as well 
as to improve public safety and respect taxpayers (Dilulio, et al., 1993).  If a policy were 
to increase the amount of bureaucratic red tape in the justice system or further keeps the 
state from progressing in the number of just outcomes, the policy will be considered 
unfeasible and will receive a lower score. 
• Is it financially feasible? 
Mississippi is the poorest state in the United States of America, with a per capita 
income of $20,670 (2012).  Mississippi continues to have among the nation’s highest 
rates of poverty, income inequality, uninsured population, and the lowest household 
incomes (Nave, 2017).  The Mississippi legislature (or other government entity) would 
have to appropriate funds to the implementation and continuance of the policy, and there 
would undoubtedly be a need for federal assistance as funding will be a challenge in a 
relatively poor state.  The policy must be financially feasible for the state of Mississippi 
in particular, and given the realities of Mississippi’s continuing budget situation, it is 
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important that a policy proposal, no matter how potentially effective in managing this 
issue, is not so expensive as to be considered out of hand.  
 This rubric and grading scale will now be applied to three policy proposals in the 
following chapter, “Evaluating Policy Proposals.”  Each of the proposals will be 
described and discussed briefly to explain the goals and intricacies of the respective 
policy, and each will then be graded according to the rubric in order to discern which 
policy would best address prosecutorial misconduct and abuses of discretion Mississippi.  
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Chapter 4  
Evaluating Policy Proposals 
 In this chapter, I have chosen three policy proposals from legal experts and 
criminal justice reform organizations which are aimed at addressing the risks of 
prosecutorial discretion.  As aforementioned, each of these policies falls under a category 
of policy approaches to criminal justice reform, including transparency and data 
collection, judicial disciplinary reform, and retroactive reviews of convictions by 
Conviction Integrity Units and Best Practices Committees.  In this section, I will describe 
each policy briefly in an introductory manner before applying the rubric from the 
Methodology chapter.  The three policies being discussed are: (1) the Prosecutorial 
Transparency Act (2) restricting the Harmless Error Rule; and (3) implementation of 
Conviction Review Units.  After each respective description of the proposal, the policies 
will be analyzed, scored, and compared based on how well each policy meets the 
standards of efficacy, equity, and feasibility as according to the rubric.  
Policy Description #1: Transparency and Data Collection 
The first policy recommendation is focused on data collection and transparency of 
decisions in state prosecutors’ offices.  In an article titled, “Unlocking the Black Box: 
How the Prosecutorial Transparency Act Will Empower Communities and Help End 
Mass Incarceration,” the Prosecutorial Transparency Act was proposed at the end of a 
thorough prosecutorial research project in 2019, by Nicole Zayas Fortier, advocacy and 
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policy counsel with the ACLU’s Campaign for Smart Justice, in affiliation with 
JustLeadershipUSA, the Urban Institute, Fair and Just Prosecution, and the Brennan 
Center for Justice.  Though Fortier and the legal organizations which assisted in this 
prosecutorial research project have provided the specific policy being analyzed in this 
section, they are far from the only people and organizations to propose prosecutorial 
transparency in an act of recording and publishing data.  The “Prosecutorial Transparency 
Act,” is attached as an Appendix to the report and is a model bill that provides a template 
for state legislatures and was chosen for analysis and evaluation because of the recency of 
its data culmination and research. 
This proposed legislation identifies and defines data points that must be collected 
and reported by prosecutors, focusing on characteristics and conditions which provide 
insight into a prosecutor’s critical thinking and decision-making.  These points include 
the demographics of the charged individual, charge description, initial charge and 
possible penalties, charge modifications and corresponding penalties, bail type, bail 
amount, plea offer, date of plea offer, dates of pretrial detention, case disposition, 
sentence type, sentence conditions, and sentence length.  This legislation also requires 
that all prosecutors’ offices in the state provide this data on an annual basis to a central 
state agency that is responsible for making the data publicly available and issuing annual 
analyses and reports.  The Transparency Act guides the state agency through a 3-year 
implementation plan that could be enacted on a rolling basis, for example, by beginning 
with the reporting of only a subset of data points in the initial years, and/or beginning by 
reporting by the largest state prosecutors’ offices. 
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The legislation also requires prosecutors to identify their written policies and 
codes of conduct in each respective office, making those policies public or requiring 
prosecutors to disclose the absence of such policies.  These policies include matters such 
as bail and sentencing practices, plea bargain guidelines, discovery practices, prosecuting 
youth as adults, and screening for mental health.  Adoption of this legislation also 
requires basic reporting on staffing, training, and disciplinary practices in the 
prosecutor’s office.  The principle goal of this policy is to allow communities and court 
systems to demand greater consequences for egregious actions, as well as demand better 
representation where prosecutors’ offices do not employ a staff which is representative of 
the community; further, this information could create the opportunity for the community 
to develop better trust in their prosecutors by seeing those who engage in misconduct 
being held accountable.  The adoption of the Transparency Act also calls for the creation 
of an Advisory Board that includes representatives of impacted communities as well as 
criminal defense attorneys who can enforce compliance by prohibiting a prosecutor’s 
office from receiving state funding should that an office fail to comply with the Act’s 
provisions.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, state prosecutors report very little data on critical 
decisions, and of that data, even less is accessible by the public.  Prosecutors seldom even 
make public their office policies and guidelines by which they exercise their powers on a 
daily basis. People and communities damaged by mass incarceration are all too familiar 
with the consequences of prosecutorial decision-making.  Making data and policies 
transparent is critical in revealing systemic problems, motivating policymakers, and 
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developing effective solutions.  This model legislation would require all prosecutors to 
make their policies public, and to record and report data. 
Part IV of the report provides an overview of the “Prosecutorial Transparency 
Act” that includes potential solutions to issues of concern in the implementation of the 
policy, including ways to address costs, privacy concerns, and logistical administrative 
burdens on small prosecutors’ offices.  This report shows that setting basic minimum 
transparency standards for all prosecutors in a state is not only desperately needed, but 
also possible.  Legislating mandatory statewide data reporting on prosecutorial decisions 
would allow for actual public access to prosecutors’ policies and to data that would 
improve accountability and decision-making by prosecutors as well as increasing the 
public’s trust.  
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is best judged in each specific context—
from decisions to modify charges, offer diversion, or engage in plea-bargaining—but that 
context is often invisible without more information than is currently available.  
Prosecutorial transparency reform acts, similar to this one, have been implemented in 
several states already.  For example, in 2008, the state attorney for the Eight Judicial 
Circuit in Florida began tracking prosecutors’ decision-making in his district throughout 
the lives of their cases.  Along with increased managerial and administrative efficiency, 
the data collection “enabled his office to define success as achieving just and fair case 
outcomes, rather than the number of convictions” (Fortier, 2019).  The office developed 
new metrics and programs which helped to better explain prosecutorial decisions and 
allowed the prosecutors to publicly share their office’s new definition of judicial 
“success.” Also, in March 2018, the Florida legislature passed a comprehensive criminal 
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data collection and disclosure law, Senate Bill 1392 (Florida Senate, 2018).  This bill is 
the first and only statewide data policy of its kind in the United States as of right now, 
requiring each county to identify and publish standardized, robust information related to 
pretrial release, bonds, charges, please, sentencing, and demographics (Fortier, 2019).  
This allowed for information, which was previously extremely difficult to access, to 
foster exponentially better understanding and availability for study by researchers, press, 
and the public.  Florida lawmakers and government officials anticipate that this data 
collection and transparency reform will “be the first step toward greater data-driven 
reforms of the criminal legal system... [and] that the availability of race and ethnicity data 
will allow watchdogs to more easily and conclusively spot issues of racial bias in the 
system” (Fortier, 2019).  
Policy Evaluation #1: Transparency and Data Collection 
Efficacy 
• Does the policy prevent or discourage prosecutors from abusing their power?  
By collecting, analyzing, and publishing data on how they use their discretion, 
prosecutors will know that their decisions are public knowledge.  This policy could create 
a greater sense of self-accountability in prosecutors, as they know that the electorate will 
surely hold them accountable if they do not themselves.  A primary goal of this proposal 
is to create a stronger connection between prosecutors and the public, so it could also 
allow the community to build a trusting relationship with their prosecutors, knowing that 
they can hold the prosecutors accountable through elections and public demand.  As in 
Florida, justice “watchdogs” would also more easily be able to identify and expose 
prosecutorial abuses of discretion.  If the greatest points of prosecutorial decision-making 
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are public knowledge, the public and the prosecutors will be able to clearly see any 
cognitive biases and unjust practices at work. As Fortier writes, “Greater transparency 
allows voters to evaluate whether prosecutors have followed through on their promises, 
allowing them to make informed choices at the voting booth.  For communities where 
trust with prosecutors has been eroded by decades of punitive practices, transparency is 
one small but necessary step to restoring dialogue and ultimately improving the 
prosecutors’ responsiveness to community needs” (Fortier, 2019). 
While some electorates may be more or less inclined to foster the goals of 
transparency—such as an electorate which is more kind to the racist or classist biases in 
their court systems—the importance of institutionalizing transparency is that it extends 
the information beyond the immediate citizenry. We can see this happen particularly in 
Winona, MS, in the case of Curtis Flowers; outside reporters came to the state to 
investigate and incite change. They were not always welcomed by the community of 
Winona, and in fact, reported many instances of Winona citizens proclaiming that there 
was nothing wrong with Doug Evans’s actions (Baran, 2019).  The bare-bones 
knowledge of the case of Curtis Flowers opened up the possibility for outside pressures to 
emerge and help achieve the goals of justice, and greater transparency in all cases in the 
state of Mississippi would allow for even more opportunities for change.  
As shown in the Chapter 2, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion varies widely 
and is best judged in case-by-case context.  This legislation would document cases from 
beginning to end and exhibits prosecutorial decisions in this specific context.  No matter 
the type of power or discretionary decision made, the transparency of these data points 
will allow greater and more thorough reviews of those decisions.  The data collected after 
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the implementation of this policy would allow individual decisions of prosecutors to be 
analyzed and compared, and it would ensure that the abuses of discretion and power 
pointed out in Chapter 2 are public knowledge and subject to consequences if 
inappropriate or unjust.  
Efficacy Score: 4 
Equity 
• Does the policy negatively impact one group (social, racial, etc.) more than 
another? 
The policy only addresses occurring and future incidences of prosecutorial abuse 
of power and discretion.  This leaves the millions of Americans who were prosecuted 
before the policy’s implementation without the data on their trials to showcase potential 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The policy does not address past cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct, so many of these cases will continue to be unrecognized and unresolved, so 
the issue of current prosecutors in the Mississippi criminal justice system who should 
have been disciplined in the past will still not face the consequences for those past 
actions.  Only new cases of prosecutorial misconduct following the implementation of 
this legislation would be subject to review and potential discipline.   
In addition to the absence of retroactive solutions to risks of prosecutorial 
discretion in Mississippi, there are also privacy concerns which arise with any 
governmental collection, centralization, and publishing of personal information.  These 
concerns must be addressed carefully and with safeguards put in place to protect civilians 
against misuse or accidental disclosure. The Prosecutorial Transparency Act addresses 
these concerns by (1) assigning a unique identifier (random number) in place of names, 
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(2) providing that only de-identified data is released publicly; and (3) declining to collect 
some especially sensitive information, such as people’s sexual orientation or immigration 
status. 
• Will it increase equity among prosecutor’s decisions in the justice system?  
The policy will most certainly increase equity among decisions and outcomes in 
the Mississippi criminal justice system through the public’s, reviewing court’s, and 
prosecutors’ new ability to analyze cases and identify discrepancies in the treatment of 
individuals.  As people will be able to point to specific cases which resulted in certain 
outcomes, they will also be able to clearly review prosecutorial data and evaluate the 
equity and fairness among their decisions.  
Equity Score: 3 
Feasibility 
• Could/Would the policy be passed by the Mississippi governing bodies?  
As far as likelihood of implementation in Mississippi, I am unsure how convinced 
the state legislature will be by the necessity of such a financial and thorough undertaking.   
The Mississippi legislature has been historically unwilling to pass legislation which may 
be interpreted as not hard-on-crime.  In 2019, the ACLU of Mississippi tracked and 
documented criminal justice reform bills in the state, unveiling the legislature’s strong 
resistance to such reform proposals.  Most, if not all, criminal justice reform acts died in 
committee and were not presented, let alone debated, by members of either the 
Mississippi House of Representatives or Senate.  For example, House Bill 192 was an act 
to create a task force to study and address the disparity of African-American males in the 
judicial system.  House Bill 198 was a criminal justice reform act which would give 
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nonviolent offenders the opportunity to reduce their sentences by meeting certain criteria, 
such as passing subject area tests.  House Bill 223 was a simple reform bill which would 
create a procedure to allow a special prosecutor to act on behalf of the District attorney 
when he or she is absent or unable to perform his or her duties.  Each of these criminal 
justice reform acts died in committee.  
• Does the policy allow the justice system to function effectively?  
Logistically, ensuring uniform and consistent reporting from offices of so many 
different capacities presents significant challenges. The Prosecutorial Transparency Act 
addresses this challenge by having a centralized state agency take responsibility for 
designing a uniform reporting system to collect and analyze the gathered data, as well as 
enforce the collection and reporting of data from prosecutors’ offices.  The creation of 
this agency relieves some of the burden on smaller offices, while also creating a state-
level body to analyze all of the data provided. Reliably tracking and analyzing more data 
can lead to vastly improved capacities to make informed decisions about everything from 
human resources to choosing case strategies.  The data can also assist individual offices 
in compiling annual reports and streamlining budget proposals, as well as grant requests 
for lawmakers or other law enforcement agencies.  Managers of prosecutors’ offices will 
be able to better measure performance of their staff and increase the efficiency and 
quality of work in the office, and they will also be better able to locate and supervise 
attorneys who are not meeting the standards of the office and justice system or are 
violating the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.  Further, prosecutors will be 
able to more easily track court appearances and filing deadlines through the system after 
implementation.  This act would take time and detailed effort to achieve its goals, 
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creating more work for lawyers or any employee of the criminal justice system; however, 
as technology advances and the compilation of data becomes streamlined and second-
nature, a centralized reporting mechanism would increase the efficiency of the justice 
system in the long run.  
• Is it financially feasible? 
The implementation of the Prosecutorial Transparency Act would require the 
allocation of additional resources in Mississippi to create new capacity within a central 
state agency and to support prosecutors’ offices where additional infrastructure is needed 
to collect the mandated data.  Unfortunately, in a particularly poor state compared to the 
rest of the nation, the concerns about cost may be a halting point in implementing the 
policy; however, some prosecutors’ offices already have budgets which could reasonably 
be expected to facilitate the development of additional data infrastructure with existing 
resources.  Before any fiscal note is attached to a state’s Prosecutorial Transparency Act, 
a detailed assessment must be made of what additional resources are actually needed to 
facilitate data collection, and it should be noted that major components of the Act—
collecting and publicly sharing data, policies, and staffing information—would call for 
expensive investments in technology but would have considerable returns.  
Feasibility Score: 2 
Overall Score: 3 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Policy Grading Scale: How well does Policy #1 meet each standard? 
 
 
 
Policy Description #2: Judicial Review and Disciplinary Reform 
The second policy recommendation up for evaluation comes from Thomas 
Sullivan and Maurice Possley’s article from 2015, titled, “The Chronic Failure to 
Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform.”  Falling under the 
category of judicial review and disciplinary reform, this proposal recommends that 
prosecutorial disciplinary measures be reformed through the United States Supreme 
Court, state Supreme Courts, and state legislature’s restriction of the harmless error rule.  
For much of American legal history, any error in trial which violated a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial required reversal.  The doctrine allowing a constitutional 
error to be “harmless” did not arrive until 1967, in Chapman v. California, when the 
Supreme Court created a couple of new rules: (1) constitutional errors can be “harmless,” 
and (2) constitutional errors require reversal unless the government proves the error was 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The second rule placed a heavy burden on the 
government, suggesting that most errors would continue to result in reversal, but the first 
rule resulted in the Court’s acknowledging that some errors were “so basic to a fair trial 
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless,” such as the admission of a coerced 
(1) Not at All
(2) Not Well
(3) Moderately Well
(4) Very Well
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confession (Newland, et al., 2019).  Under the “harmless error” legal doctrine, appellate 
judges routinely affirm convictions tainted by legal—particularly prosecutorial—error 
when confident that the appealing defendant is indeed guilty.  Harmless error is one of 
the most frequently used doctrines in all of criminal appeals, and profoundly influences 
the behavior of all parties in the criminal justice system (Newland, et al., 2019).   
The precise rules of “harmless error” are often unclear and depend on the type of 
error that has occurred in a trial on a case-by-case basis.  If the error in question has not 
affected a defendant’s constitutional rights, a reviewing court may reverse his/her 
conviction only on the basis that the error had “substantial or injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jury’s verdict.”  If the error has affected the defendant’s constitutional 
rights, the court must decide whether the error was a “structural error” or a “trial error.”  
Structural errors can never be considered harmless, and are direct violations of justice and 
constitutional rights, such as the denial of the rights to counsel, an impartial judge, 
or biased jury trial. These errors result in automatic conviction reversal.  Trial errors, 
such as the use of erroneous or illegally seized evidence, must be reversed unless the state 
can prove that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (Newland, et al., 
2019).  
The problems inherent in the harmless error rule are many, well-known, and not 
limited to breaches of the Brady rule—throwing out or excluding possibly exculpatory 
evidences.  Often, reviewing court opinions that do call attention to prosecutorial 
violations of established rules nevertheless affirm convictions, creating little or no 
deterrent value to prosecutors’ deciding to not disclose evidence beneficial to a 
defendant’s case.  These reviewing court decisions have had the effect of emboldening 
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aggressive prosecutors, as seen with District Attorneys Forrest Allgood and Doug Evans. 
The harmless error doctrine particularly causes issues when applied to cases of violations 
of constitutional rights.  Harmless error ignores important constitutional values because 
the sole focus on a defendant’s guilt distracts from the mission of justice overall.  
Constitutional rights are there to ensure equality, and focusing only on guilt in these cases 
of violated constitutional rights under the current applications of the harmless error 
doctrine disregards those values. 
Harmless error also violates constitutional law by ignoring the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that “harmless-error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers 
that an error has been committed.”  Reviewing courts frequently skip the question of 
whether an error has occurred, and conclude that any possible error which may have 
occurred was “harmless” (Newland, et al., 2019).  By not deciding whether a 
constitutional error did occur in trial, the reviewing courts fail to perform their basic 
functions of clarifying the laws which govern the actions of prosecutors and the justice 
system in general.  
In Mississippi criminal courts, the harmless error doctrine focuses exclusively on 
the perceived strength of the government’s evidence against the defendant. “Generally, 
this Court has applied the harmless error doctrine in only cases where the evidence of 
defendant’s guilt was ‘overwhelming’” (Smith, 136 So. 3d at 435).  This means that if the 
government’s evidence appears strong—or rather, the court is certain of the defendant’s 
guilt—the court will not carefully consider the ways in which an error might have 
affected the jury’s verdict, as the “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test” mandates. The 
reviewing court will simply affirm the conviction.  In only relying on the observed 
 56 
strength of the prosecutor’s case, reviewing courts essentially make “the fact-finding 
role” of the jury irrelevant; therefore, the current use of this doctrine violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a trial by jury.  This means that when a reviewing 
court decides that any of the government’s evidence was illegally admitted, there is no 
longer a verdict based exclusively on legal evidence.  Further, if an appeals court 
excludes this illegal evidence and the remaining legal evidence allows any inference of 
innocence, the proper allocation of Sixth Amendment rights would require a full reversal 
of the conviction.  This would mean that a jury—not a group of appellate judges who did 
not attend the trial—can legally decide whether the defendant is guilty or not.  There is 
no presence or appearance which conveys body language, demeanor, or other vocal 
implications which can be included in the transcripts of trials given to the appellate 
courts, and basing a conviction solely on a trial transcript often leads to cognitive biases 
and false conclusions of guilt (Sullivan, et al., 2015).  
Nowhere in the U.S. Constitution does it say that any violation of its protections 
can be “harmless,” but the Supreme Court has offered several justifications for the 
harmless error doctrine it created.  The first justification is that harmless error is 
necessary to avoid the time and expense of retrials and to conserve “scarce judicial 
resources” (Singh, 2012).   The second justification for the harmless error doctrine is that 
it “promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying 
fairness of the trial” (Newland, et al., 2019).  The courts assume that the public sees an 
affirmed conviction as true and without error, generating greater public respect and trust 
in their prosecutors.  This is a particularly weak justification for the harmless error 
doctrine, as affirming illegally found convictions only creates a false trust in the judicial 
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system, and further, it promotes the lack of transparency of the judicial system as well as 
the public’s ignorance to constitutional violations.  The false public trust of the judicial 
system merely ensures a greater safeguard for the courts from the threat of resistance.  
This policy proposal argues that a more stringent formulation of the harmless 
error rule is needed to rid the justice system of the prosecutors who do not adhere to the 
principle that their primary duty is to achieve justice rather than a record of convictions.  
While the harmless error doctrine has good legal intent, the current application of the 
doctrine allows prosecutors to comfortably engage in misconduct and receive no 
consequences.  Convictions must be legally attained, and whether a conviction is the end 
result regardless of a prosecutor’s mistake, routinely deeming errors “harmless” without 
ensuring the ultimate fairness of the trial is a threat to the goal of justice as a whole.   
The authors of this policy recommend that if errors occur during criminal trials 
due to misconduct of law enforcement personnel, the trial court and reviewing court 
judges and/or attorneys should call for a new trial unless the court is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error (1) was not due to intentional conduct on the part of law 
enforcement personnel, and (2) did not affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  These 
questions would be answered by the trial and reviewing court judges and attorneys after 
questioning and investigating the actions of the prosecutor. Further, unless it is 
abundantly clear that the prosecutor’s misconduct was not intentional and did not affect 
the outcome of the trial, the court should refer the matter to disciplinary authorities, with 
the transgressor’s name included.  More rigorous and strict applications of harmless error 
policies are needed in order to send clear messages to the errant prosecutors that they 
must conform their conduct to applicable rules of justice, or they will be publicly named 
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and cited as the reason for injustice, the need for a retrial, and irresponsible use of power 
and government resources.  
Policy Evaluation #2: Judicial Review and Disciplinary Reform 
Efficacy  
• Does the policy prevent or discourage prosecutors from abusing their power?  
Restricting the harmless error rule in reviewing court cases could discourage 
prosecutors from abusing their power, as they would be reprimanded more often and 
much more publicly.  Mississippi prosecutors—those who routinely abuse their powers in 
the comfort of assuming reviewing courts will ultimately find their errors to be 
harmless—would be far less reckless with their discretion if the harmless error rule was 
clearer and more punitive.  The idea that any violation of a constitutional right or access 
to a fair trial could be harmless is a dangerous and threatening sentiment to all 
Americans.  Appellate courts and judges should apply the harmless error doctrine much 
more firmly in order to ensure that the constitutional rights of all defendants—and all 
American citizens for that matter—are protected and valued.  Prosecutors would be more 
likely to review their decisions before acting upon them if they knew that any real 
consequence would occur should they violate the rights of a defendant or illegally utilize 
their power to achieve a conviction.   
Unlike the first policy proposal, however, this policy does not guarantee that all of 
the major decisions a prosecutor makes in a criminal case are public knowledge—
meaning they would not be subject to public/electorate review and analysis.  Only the 
decisions and actions which occur during a trial and are actively appealed by the 
defendant would ever be subject to review by either appellate courts or the public.  
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Moreover, the likelihood of trial and reviewing court judges or attorneys catching and 
subsequently calling attention to a prosecutorial error allows for these officers of the 
court to have plausible deniability.  There is no guarantee they would notice or act upon 
any error they may have witnessed.  For these reasons, I believe that while this policy 
would help discourage or prevent prosecutors from abusing their powers, restricting the 
harmless error rule would not prevent potential abuse from prosecutors as well as the 
Transparency Act.  
Efficacy Score: 2 
Equity 
• Does the policy negatively impact one group (social, racial, etc.) more than 
another? 
As a policy that is directed towards righting the wrongs of prosecutors, no social 
group or particular demographic of American citizens would be negatively impacted, 
only prosecutors found guilty of error in criminal trials.  The policy would be equitable in 
that convicted offenders could continue to appeal their convictions, even after they had 
used all of their appeals, as long as they could point to legitimate error by the prosecutor 
in their trial.  
• Will it increase equity among prosecutor’s decisions in the justice system and 
promote the overall goal of justice?  
I believe this policy would increase accountability among prosecutors and would 
promote the overall goal of justice; however, there is no guarantee that it will increase 
equity among all of many the decisions prosecutors make in the duration of a criminal 
case.  There is no telling how more punitive judgments of prosecutorial misconduct will 
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affect the equity and equality of decisions prosecutors make across all criminal cases.  
While this policy would allow for more appeals and retrials when errors have been 
committed by prosecutors in a criminal trial, the policy would not necessarily ensure that 
prosecutorial decisions themselves would become more equitable across the life spans of 
all cases.  Restricting the harmless error rule could discourage inequitable decisions being 
made by prosecutors at least during criminal trials, but there is no assurance that more 
stringent use of the harmless error doctrine would increase equity of decisions made 
across individual cases.  
Equity Score: 2 
Feasibility 
• Could/Would the policy be passed by the Mississippi governing bodies?  
Whereas the United States Supreme Court decided the restrictions and 
characteristics of the harmless error doctrine, and as Mississippi is a conservative state 
with little chance of proactively questioning the greater American courts, I feel the 
Mississippi legislature would not enact this policy.  However, in light of recent events in 
the Curtis Flowers case and the national attention brought to Mississippi prosecutors in 
the past two years, the Mississippi Supreme Court might possibly be more inclined to 
implement a stricter harmless error doctrine, but as the public’s attention fades away from 
this case in particular, the chances of implementation decrease every day.  
• Does the policy allow the justice system to function effectively? 
An argument against the feasibility of a stricter harmless error rule is that if 
appellate courts did reverse all convictions which were proven to include constitutional 
violations, the resulting number of retrials could create overwhelming court dockets.  An 
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important counter-argument is that harmless error does not necessarily reduce the amount 
of time that judges spend on criminal cases in comparison to the time they would spend 
with stricter harmless error.  This policy, if applied correctly, would not only decrease the 
number of prosecutorial abuses of power which necessitate a retrial, but also with the 
standards of the policy’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test, the stricter harmless error rules 
would shift a large portion of work to appellate judges.  In each layer of review of a 
criminal appeal, at least three judges will hear the case, and each of those judges must 
examine the entire trial record in order to analyze the evidence of both the prosecutor and 
defendant, as well as any possible effects that an error may have had on a conviction.  
• Is it financially feasible for Mississippi? 
In the analysis of the previous question, the argument that there would not be an 
overwhelming increase in court dockets, the Mississippi criminal justice system should 
be able to handle the possibility of more retrials.  That being said, the state of Mississippi 
is already considered “behind” in court cases, as the state crime lab is underfunded, 
undermanned, and egregiously lacking in its ability to handle its current level of cases in 
a timely manner (Fowler, 2018).  This has been a fact known for years now, and there 
seems to be little if any real effort by the state government of Mississippi to fix that 
problem; so, while more retrials in MS may be technically financially feasible, the ability 
of appellate courts to review newly discovered evidence or re-test old evidence will be a 
huge barrier to the efficacy of this policy.  In addition, public defenders are commonly 
overworked and have far too many cases for them to provide the best defense to each of 
their clients.  Keeping older cases on their dockets would only worsen the problem of not 
being able to properly dedicate themselves to the defense in each case.  
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Feasibility Score: 2 
Overall Score: 2 
Figure 3 
 
Policy Grading Scale: How well does Policy #2 meet each standard? 
 
 
Policy Description #3: Conviction Review Units 
The third and final policy proposal to be analyzed and graded is found in John 
Hollway’s and the University of Pennsylvania Law school’s “Conviction Review Units: 
A National Perspective” from 2016.  The policy recommendation argues for the 
implementation of a Conviction Review Unit (CRU), sometimes called a Conviction 
Integrity Unit (CIU), which conducts extrajudicial, fact-based reviews of convictions in 
order to investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence.  A CRU is typically 
contained within a local prosecutor’s office.  A CRU dedicated to collaborative, good-
faith case reviews designed to ensure the factual integrity of a conviction should be 
independent, flexible, and transparent in its work.  
A CRU would be an independent agency in each prosecutorial office in 
Mississippi which reports directly to the District Attorney (DA) or prosecuting attorney, 
or head of the prosecutor’s office, and would not be contained within the Office’s 
appellate or post-conviction/habeas unit.  The unit would be led by a well-respected 
(1) Not at All
(2) Not Well
(3) Moderately Well
(4) Very Well
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attorney with ample prosecutorial and criminal experience, and would lead the effort to 
protect defendants and the justice system against cognitive or confirmatory biases by 
including at least one external criminal defense attorney in the process of CRU policy 
definition, case screening, case investigation, and recommendations for action (Hollway, 
2016).  The CRU personnel should be trained on specific judicial standards including 
errors known to lead to inaccurate conviction, discrepancies in past and current 
advancements in scientific and forensic evidence, and investigative techniques useful for 
cold cases (Hollway, 2016). The CRU would also exclude any personnel who 
participated in a case currently under review by the CRU, limiting participation in such 
cases only to the provision of information regarding unclear factors of a case.  
A CRU should be flexible in that it will accept any and all cases for review which 
contain a plausible claim of factual innocence for the conviction obtained, and “review all 
petitions on their factual merits and not on non-substantive grounds” (Hollway, 2016). 
This means that the CRU would permit review of petitions in which the defendant plead 
guilty to the charges or where the sentence has been completed.  The unit would review 
cases where due process supports allegations of innocence, such as, in the cases of 
ineffective defense counsel, newly discovered evidence, or official misconduct.  The 
CRU would also allow for petitions to be resubmitted in the case of discovering newly 
credible evidence.  
Convictions would be vacated where there is clear and convincing evidence of 
innocence, or where in the interests of justice, the CRU believes that the current evidence 
does not support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  In addition, the unit will 
communicate openly with the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel regarding their respective 
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case’s review, as well as share any evidence gathered and explain its reasoning for 
decisions and actions following such review. The CRU would encourage open exchange 
of information, including open file discovery and the disclosure of information 
discovered during the unit’s investigation, leaving out any information which could 
endanger any third parties.  The CRU would define any information to be withheld from 
the petitioner during the unit’s review and establish a process for third-party review of the 
information to ensure good judicial reasoning behind not disclosing specific information.  
In addition, a CRU would help foster a “culture of learning from error within the 
prosecutor’s office,” suggesting reforms to prevent the recurrence of errors that resulted 
in an inaccurate conviction (Hollway, 2016).  In seeking to prevent the recurrence of such 
errors, the Conviction Review Unit should:  
1. Conduct a root cause analysis or “Just Culture Event Review,” separate and 
apart from the CRU case review, on each case where a recommendation is 
made to alter a conviction, to understand and address the circumstances and 
environments that allowed one or more errors to occur in the administration of 
justice;  
2. Identify improved policies and procedures for each stakeholder that might 
prevent the recurrence of the error(s) that permitted the flawed conviction to 
occur; and  
3. Construct a process to implement, publicize, and evaluate those modifications 
throughout the jurisdiction (Hollway, 2016).  
The Conviction Integrity Unit should have no structural ties to any prosecutor’s 
office, and it might be expected that a CRU investigation into may be received less than 
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enthusiastically from prosecutors in the jurisdictions where the cases originated.  Further, 
the unit would have subpoena power to aid in its investigations as any recommendations 
made by the unit would lack the power of law.  In order to ensure proper preventions for 
such actions be put in place, the CRU would present its findings to the relevant DA’s 
Office in a public hearing to a judge.   
Policy Evaluation #3: Conviction Review Units 
Efficacy  
• Does the policy prevent or discourage prosecutors from abusing their power?  
Conviction review units would not necessarily prevent prosecutors from abusing 
their power; however, they may discourage such actions.  Because the units can present 
their post-investigation findings to a judge in court and make public policy 
recommendations which call out the mistakes made in previous trials, there is a much 
greater chance that any possible prosecutorial misconduct which aided in achieving a 
conviction would be recognized and acknowledged by the justice system, state officials, 
and the public.  This could increase self-accountability among prosecutors and judicial 
accountability among the entities meant to discipline and manage faulty prosecutions, as 
well as the public’s ability to hold prosecutors accountable in elections.  The public may 
be better able to see the errors in prosecutions by learning the CRUs recommendations 
and following up on if and how well those recommendations were accepted or 
implemented.  Seeing as how this policy is not directed towards prosecutorial 
accountability, but rather incidences of wrongful or unjust convictions, the policy would 
not guarantee that prosecutors would change their behaviors or act upon their 
discretionary decisions any more carefully.  This policy only ensures that some 
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prosecutorial decisions which may or may not have led to a wrongful conviction would 
be reviewed and possibly resolved.  
Conviction Review Units have become more common.  According to the annual 
report of the National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) released in 2018, 42 of 139 
exonerations involved Conviction Integrity Units.  While the number of CIUs is 
increasing, they are still considered rare.  There are around 2,300 prosecutor’s offices in 
the United States, and about 98.5 percent of offices do not contain CRU (Rice, 2018).  
Further, the existence of a CRU does not guarantee much, as many of those established 
currently have accomplished little to nothing.  Of the 33 CRU (or CIU) offices registered 
in the report, only 12 have ever exonerated anyone and another 5 have only exonerated 
one (Rice, 2018).  Further, achieving exonerations retroactively is not going to prevent or 
discourage prosecutors from abusing their discretionary decision-making powers.  CRUs 
may help the overall goal of achieving justice, but it would do little to address the risks of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
Efficacy Score: 1 
Equity 
• Does the policy negatively impact one group (social, racial, etc.) more than 
another? 
An underlying issue within Conviction Review Units is that in order to submit a 
petition, convicted defendants require legal help which they might not have.  As 
mentioned before, public defenders are commonly overworked and often have too many 
cases to provide the best defense to each of their clients.  Keeping older cases on their 
dockets would only worsen the problem of not being able to properly dedicate themselves 
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to the defense in each case, and conviction review units would only increase the number 
of cases to which public defenders are assigned.  This creates an inequality among 
defendants who have the financial resources to maintain their own defense counsel, 
further widening the gap between the quality and effectiveness of public defenders versus 
paid counsel.  The CRU would also take on whichever cases were most riddled with 
misconduct as they would be reasonably limited to some manageable numbers of cases.  
This would create more inequity across cases because some would be deemed more 
worthy than others. 
• Will it increase equity among prosecutor’s decisions in the justice system and 
promote the overall goal of justice?  
The ability of the CRU’s to present their findings to a judge in court and make 
public recommendations for the prevention of any future errors would surely promote the 
overall goal of justice in theory.  In practice, the implementation of a conviction review 
unit could possibly increase equity among decisions in some cases—those which are 
chosen to be reviewed.  In addition, the CRUs would decide whether or not the error 
warrants a reversal of conviction and retrial or whether the error did not result in a 
wrongful conviction.  In a sense, the CRUs would be the taskforce which decides whether 
an error was both harmless to the trial and unintentional, instead of the trial court and 
reviewing court judges who would make that decision in the previous policy.  The justice 
achieved by the CRU would be completely reliant on those who make up the unit, 
meaning that a biased or corrupt CRU would not increase equity among prosecutors’ 
decisions. cases which the unit reviews, if not in prosecutorial decisions themselves.   
Equity Score: 2 
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Feasibility 
• Could/Would the policy be passed by the Mississippi governing bodies?  
As the description of this proposal admits, conviction review units may not be 
warmly welcomed by prosecutor’s offices, and whereas many Mississippi government 
officials either have been state prosecutors or have close and confident relationships with 
state prosecutors, it is somewhat unlikely that the state officials necessary to implement 
this CRUs would support the creation of any agency to be ‘watchdogs’ and question the 
integrity of state prosecutors.  The state legislature would likely be more inclined to 
legislate the collection of data for public knowledge or reform legal policy than fund a 
taskforce of babysitters to do the job that the court system of Mississippi is failing to do.  
• Does the policy allow the justice system to function effectively? 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the state of Mississippi is already 
considered “behind” in court cases, as the state crime lab is underfunded, undermanned, 
and lacking in its ability to efficiently or effectively handle its current level of cases 
(Fowler, 2018).  A conviction review unit would require the allocation of resources to 
ensure the unit was in any way effective in righting past wrongs of criminal courts; and 
while Mississippi may be technically financially capable of reallocating resources or 
designating funding to judicial reform efforts—much like the ability of appellate courts 
discussed in the second proposal analysis—the ability of conviction review units to 
review newly discovered evidence or re-test old evidence will be barred by the state 
crime lab’s inability to process the current number cases they have.   
• Is it financially feasible? 
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The implementation of the Conviction Review Unit would require the allocation 
of additional resources in Mississippi to create new capacity within the Mississippi 
criminal justice system within prosecutors’ offices which would build additional 
infrastructure to ensure the CRU’s ability to function.  As aforementioned, Mississippi is 
a particularly poor state compared to the rest of the nation, and cost concerns will 
undoubtedly be a main point of opposition from those who would not support this policy. 
While this policy may consider reallocations of the state budget in a similar way to those 
necessary for the theoretical implementation of Policy #1, the money potentially spent on 
CRUs would be better spent on a more effective and equitable policy, such as the data 
collection in Policy #1.  
Feasibility Score: 1 
Overall Score: 1.?̅?  1 
 
Figure 4 
 
Policy Grading Scale: How well does Policy #3 meet each standard?  
 
  
(1) Not at All
(2) Not Well
(3) Moderately Well
(4) Very Well
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Chapter 5 
Policy Recommendations: Solving the Problem 
Throughout the evaluation process of the policy proposals introduced in the 
previous chapter, I have explored three policy options which have promised to solve the 
problem of prosecutorial misconduct and abuses of power in American criminal justice 
systems.  What became most apparent in the theoretical implementation of each of these 
policies in Mississippi are the reasons for which the state of Mississippi has consistently 
refused to recognize or acknowledge any particular problem with its prosecutors at all: 
politics.  The policy which scored the highest in my evaluations was the Transparency 
Act, which nonetheless received a score of less-than-perfect—or “4: Very Well”—in the 
theoretical feasibility of its implementation for this very reason.  In searching for any 
possible policy options regarding any and all types of criminal justice reform which have 
been introduced to the state legislature in recent years, I found myriads of policies had, 
indeed, been introduced; each of them died in committee or was not enacted for some 
other reason (ACLU, 2019).   
Feasibility seems to be the greatest challenge to reform efforts in the state of 
Mississippi; however, feasibility is not given more or less weight in evaluations.  This is 
because truly feasible policies in Mississippi are passed and implemented by the 
legislature and other government officials regularly, but that does not mean any of these 
policies are necessarily effective in addressing the issues for which they are aimed nor 
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helping to increase equity among lives and treatment of all citizens within the state.  
Hypothetically, if we suspend our disbelief for a moment and consider the policy options 
as if feasibility were not a challenge in Mississippi, the Prosecutorial Transparency Act 
(Policy #1) would be the ideal policy for the state of Mississippi, according to my 
evaluations in the previous chapter.  The Mississippi state legislature should enact the 
Prosecutorial Transparency Act (PTA) and mandate all prosecutor’s offices to record and 
report each of the data points and further requirements, publishing the information on 
each respective prosecutor’s office website.  As state prosecutors are elected public 
servants, the public is entitled to information regarding the practices of prosecutors and 
their decision-making processes.  A state agency (either newly established or currently 
operating) should be allocated proper funding to ensure the recording and reporting of the 
prosecutorial decision-making process by prosecutors themselves as outlined in the 
Transparency Act and the publishing of data in a timely and consistent fashion.  Should a 
prosecutor’s office not comply with the Act, that prosecutor’s office shall be ineligible to 
receive funding from the state’s general fund (or other budgetary allocation).  Funding 
would only resume after full compliance with the requirements of the Act, after the 
prosecutor’s office provides the mandated information from the beginning of its non-
compliance and through the current date.  The state agency in charge of ensuring 
compliance with the Act will conduct a review and decide whether or not to certify that 
the prosecutor’s office is now in compliance with this Act. 
However, while this would be the ideal policy to implement, the feasibility of this 
policy—as discussed various times throughout this thesis—is entirely reliant on the 
Mississippi state legislature’s support.  In expectation of the legislature’s opposition to 
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this Act, there are steps which I believe must be taken in order to convince the state 
legislature and government officials of the need for this policy implementation.  The 
political barriers and deeply rooted “ole boys’ club” mentality is no reason to cease 
efforts in trying to reform Mississippi’s criminal justice system.  On the contrary, 
continuing to research and show these characteristics to the world and Mississippians 
themselves is more than necessary to convince state leaders and the electorate to hold our 
state’s criminal justice system—particularly prosecutors—accountable.   
In order to prove the issue at hand is problematic enough to warrant the 
implementation of the Prosecutorial Transparency Act, the topic must be further 
researched, documented, and widely published with fervent advocation.  For this to 
happen, there must be independent researchers who can grow the small body of research 
from this thesis focusing on the state of Mississippi with adequate funding, time, and 
support from national and state justice organizations as well as main actors in the 
Mississippi justice system itself.  The research in this thesis is particularly limited by the 
general lack of transparency of prosecutor’s offices, allowing only the summarization and 
documentation of undeniable cases of injustice which have already received attention in 
the state and even nationally.  Further, the policies which were evaluated were chosen 
with Mississippi in mind, yet they are only three of the endless number of ideas and 
proposals in existence which aim to make the justice system more fair and just.  There are 
undoubtedly policy proposals which exist that I did not encounter that may offer better 
solutions to the risks of prosecutorial discretion in Mississippi.  However, in order to 
successfully create a solution for the problem shown in Chapter 2, there must be a fully 
comprehensive understanding of the problem, and in order to fully understand the 
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problem, we must be able to access the information which reveals the true depth of the 
problem.  This thesis is only a small scratch on the surface of deep-seated judicial 
problems in Mississippi, but I have—to the best of my ability at this time—sought to 
expose these issues and call for greater accountability among all actors in our state 
criminal justice system.   
My strongest suggestion and recommendation for the state of Mississippi is to 
create a research funding mechanism which would support and foster collaboration 
across already existing research agencies and judicial organizations in their quests to 
better understand and reveal problems inherent in the Mississippi criminal justice system.  
I also recommend that the state legislature mandate all prosecutors’ offices openly release 
requested information to research institutions and justice organizations for the purpose of 
encouraging further investigation and examination of the problems explored in this thesis.  
Prosecutor’s offices have often been referred to as “black boxes” and provide little 
information to the public concerning the detailed characteristics of their practices, but it is 
entirely feasible for the state legislature to require prosecutor’s offices to release 
requested information to researchers, saving only the information which may endanger 
the judicial integrity of an ongoing case.  Should any researcher or institution working to 
reveal injustices in the Mississippi criminal justice system request and subsequently be 
denied access to information necessary for their studies, the Mississippi legislature should 
provide a way to report the denied request and evaluate the prosecutor’s office reasons 
for denying access to the information.  With financial assistance and outward support 
from the state government, researchers, judicial institutions, and civil rights organizations 
will be better able to understand and develop policy solutions which may work to 
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incrementally solve the problem, as the state of Mississippi is not easily or quickly 
receptive to change.  Of course, it is a possibility that government actors who have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo will balk at these potential reforms or choose 
not to respect the findings of the data, but only further and more concrete research will be 
able to convince government officials of the real problems in Mississippi’s criminal 
justice system.  At the very least, this type of research may further shed light on the risks 
of prosecutorial discretion in Mississippi, which in and of itself would foster greater 
transparency and bring political pressure on refractory policymakers. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
While Mississippi’s inherently racist, classist, and sexist reputation has improved 
in recent decades, the state continues to face deeply-rooted issues concerning corruption, 
nepotism, and a “good ole boy” mentality.  And though the state is no longer 
implementing outwardly racist and discriminatory policies, such as Jim Crow Laws, 
Mississippi’s history of such policies has confined racial minorities to social stations of 
second-class citizens, creating perpetual cycles of socioeconomic and educational 
struggles within racial subpopulations.   
Unfortunately, in the state of Mississippi, it is more than just historical policies 
which are keeping these cycles in rotation.  Racism is deeply imbedded in southern 
culture, and these sentiments are—both knowingly and unknowingly—passed on to 
generations of southerners who must decisively and actively un-learn the discriminatory 
views of those who came before us.  As I have learned through conducting research for 
my senior honors thesis on prosecutorial misconduct in Mississippi, individuals in 
positions of power may or may not realize their actions are discriminatory and racist; 
nonetheless, these leaders hold authority over the lives of the underprivileged, and there 
is no accountability standard in place to ensure these inequitable actions are prevented 
and/or disciplined.  The state leaders and government officials who play a large yet 
overtly uncredited role in the social and judicial injustices at hand are inarguably state 
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prosecutors, who wield dominating powers over the lives of all citizens subject to their 
discretion only.  In order for Mississippi to move forward, we must exhibit and 
acknowledge the pervasive issues of prosecutorial misconduct and abuses of power 
which continue to perpetuate the cycles of racist and classist disparities in the state of 
Mississippi, threaten the constitutional rights of all citizens involved in the justice system, 
and contribute to the state’s relatively high incarceration rate in a nation which is facing 
mass incarceration crisis overall.   
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